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Abstract
We address the effect of contextual consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in im-
perfect competition. Consumers are fully informed about match value and price at
the moment of purchase. However, some consumers are initially uninformed about
their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match—value and
price distribution, while others are perfectly informed all the time. We show that, in
duopoly, a larger share of informed consumers leads to a less competitive outcome
if the asymmetry between firms is sufficiently large and that narrowing the set of
products which consumers consider leads to a more competitive outcome.
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1 Introduction
Consumer information about price and match value of products is a key determinant of
market outcomes. If consumers are loss–averse, information prior to the moment of pur-
chase matters: Product information plays an important role at the stage at which loss–
averse consumers form expectations about future transactions.
In this paper, we investigate the competitive effects of contextual consumer loss aversion—
i.e., of consumer loss aversion when prices within a product category define the context
in which consumers make their consumption decision. Our theory applies to inspection
goods, with the feature that consumers readily observe prices in the market but have to
inspect products before knowing the match value—i.e., the fit between product character-
istics and consumer tastes.1 As we argue below, this description applies to a number of
product categories and, thus, is important for understanding market interaction.
Our setup is motivated by empirical and experimental evidence in the marketing and eco-
nomics literatures: consumer choice behavior is influenced by reference prices according
to a large body of evidence documented in the marketing literature (see Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha
(2005) for an overview). In particular, contextual reference prices which are based on
current prices within a product category at the moment of purchase affect consumer
choice—see Rajendran and Tellis (1994). According to this view consumers feel a loss
if they do not buy a cheap product within a product category. In addition, loss aver-
sion in consumer choice has been widely documented in a variety of laboratory and field
settings in the economics literature, starting with Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Fur-
thermore, loss-averse consumers may base their reference point on rational expectations,
as in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), and with respect to prices and match value, as
formalized in Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008). Empirical and experimental evidence on
multi-dimensional, expectation–based loss aversion is provided by Crawford and Meng
(2011), Ericson and Fuster (forthcoming) and Karle, Kirchsteiger, and Peitz (2011).
Following the theory of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we postulate that, to make
1The terminology of inspection goods was introduced by Hirshleifer (1973). Inspection goods and
observable prices are considered in Anderson and Renault (2009) and, more generally, in the clearing house
literature.
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their consumption choices, loss–averse consumers form their probabilistic reference point
based on expected future transactions, which are confirmed in equilibrium. Here, a con-
sumer’s reference point is her probabilistic belief about the relevant consumption out-
come (price and product match) held between the time she first focuses on the decision
determining the consumption plan—i.e., when she heard about the products in a partic-
ular context, was informed about the prices for the products on offer, and formed her
expectations—and the moment she actually makes the purchase.2
We distinguish between “informed” and “uninformed” consumers at the moment con-
sumers form their reference point. Informed consumers know their taste ex ante and will
perfectly foresee their equilibrium utility from product characteristics. Therefore, they
will not face a loss or gain in product satisfaction beyond their intrinsic valuation.
Ex–ante uninformed consumers, by contrast, are uncertain about their ideal product char-
acteristic: They form expectations about the difference between ideal and actual product
characteristic which will serve as a reference point when evaluating a product along its
match–value dimension. They will also face a gain or a loss relative to their expected dis-
tributions of price after learning the taste realization. Since all consumers become fully
informed before making their purchasing decision, we isolate the effect of consumer loss
aversion on consumption choices and abstract from the effects of differential information
at the moment of purchase. Our model can be interpreted alternatively as one in which
consumers know their ideal taste ex ante, but are exposed to uncertainty about product
characteristics when they form their reference point.
Ex–ante uninformed consumers form expectations before knowing their match value at-
tributed to a particular product, but after learning the prices of the products. This timing
with respect to information release and reference–point formation appears to be the appro-
priate modeling choice when price information is more easily accessible for consumers
than information about product characteristics.3 This is true, in particular, if price infor-
2For evidence that expectation–based counterfactuals can affect the individual’s reaction to
outcomes, see Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, and Rudd (1998), Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995), and
Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov (1999). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) have developed the general theory
of expectation–based reference points and the notion of personal equilibrium.
3In a dynamic extension in the spirit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) we would need that consumers’
expectations about prices are updated before the consumers’ expectations about match values. See the
concluding section for more detail.
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mation is provided at the moment consumers become aware of the existence of products,
but in which match value is difficult to evaluate without closer inspection. This is arguably
the case with price advertising by intermediaries such as online price comparison web-
sites, when consumers are agnostic about prices prior to seeing the posted prices. Even
if consumers did not observe product prices before entering the shop (or starting the in-
spection), in many cases consumers first access the information in the price dimension of
each product of interest and then start learning about their product–specific match values
by comparing products with each other. In particular, consumers can easily interpret price
differences, but need time to digest and interpret differences of product characteristics.
The inspection of product characteristics of both products is assumed to happen simul-
taneously. This holds trivially if consumers obtain information only from a comparison
between the two products.4
Consider an initially uninformed consumer who decides which of two or more differen-
tiated products to buy. She knows the prices of the products, e.g., because prices are
advertised or easily available on a price search engine, but learns the match value only af-
ter spending some time to figure out how useful the products are to her. Such uninformed
consumers are likely to be present in product markets in which products are bought in-
frequently and possess characteristics whose values take time to evaluate (e.g., electronic
devices, holiday trips, tools, or furniture). This also applies to markets of products whose
match value is only revealed later in time (e.g., transport services or cultural events sold
only on the spot market for which some consumers do not initially know their opportu-
nity costs for different time slots) or at the moment of inspection (e.g., perfumes for which
inexperienced consumers cannot associate a brand with a particular smell).
Since consumers observe prices before forming their reference point, firms can use price
as an expectation-management tool. In other words, price announcements affect not only
consumer behavior given reference points, but, in addition, they endogenously change
consumer preferences. If firms set different prices, uninformed consumers will face either
a loss or a gain in the price dimension ex post, depending on whether they buy the more-
or less-expensive product. Hence, an (ex ante) uninformed consumer’s realized net utility
4In the same spirit, one stream of the literature on consumer search postulates that search is non-
sequential (or fixed-sample)—see, e.g. Burdett and Judd (1983).
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depends not only on the price of the product she buys, but also on the price of the product
she does not buy. By lowering its price, a firm increases the probability the consumer
expects to buy the product. Thus, the firm can manage the probabilistic reference point
affecting the utility function at the moment of purchase. This analogously holds also in the
match-value dimension, where a price reduction increases the probability that a consumer
will buy a product that does not provide such a good fit.
Analyzing the competitive effects under consumer loss aversion, we find that consumer
loss aversion in the price dimension has a pro–competitive effect whereas loss aversion in
the match value dimension has an anti–competitive effect. We relate the pro-competitive
effect to price comparisons by consumers. In our benchmark model (symmetric duopoly
with the same degree of loss aversion in the price and match–value dimension), we find
that the anti–competitive effect dominates the pro–competitive one. This implies that a
larger fraction of ex–ante informed consumers makes competition more intense. In other
words, more widespread product information at the ex–ante stage is pro–competitive.
Thus, transparency policies for new products which increase the number of informed con-
sumers in the market have a pro–competitive and, hence, consumer–surplus–increasing
effect.
In the main part of the paper, we show that the relative weights of the two dimensions of
loss aversion are altered (1) if firms are asymmetric with respect to marginal costs or (2)
if the number of firms increases and analyze the competitive effects of loss aversion in
these settings. In asymmetric duopoly, we find that the price difference between the less
and the more efficient firm is exacerbated through the presence of uninformed loss–averse
consumers. Here, the more efficient (low–cost) firm has a strong incentive to attract those
consumers by increasing the price gap. In equilibrium, the pro–competitive effect in the
price dimension dominates the anti–competitive effect in the match–value dimension if
the cost difference (which increases the equilibrium price difference and thus the magni-
tude of loss aversion in the price dimension) is sufficiently large. An interpretation of this
results is that under strong cost asymmetries with uninformed loss–averse consumers, a
low–cost firm can be prominent by setting a low price. For instance, consider a low–cost
private label competing with a high–cost national brand. Under strong cost asymmetries,
we also predict that, in addition to releasing price information, the private label may dis-
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close match–value relevant information and thus make consumers informed ex ante to
mitigate price competition—we elaborate on this point in the discussion section.
In our second extension, we turn to symmetric oligopoly to investigate comparative statics
in the number of firms. The comparative statics effects of varying the number of firms n
are the same as those in an N-firm oligopoly when varying the size of the consumers’ con-
sideration set n < N—i.e. the number of neighboring products that consumers are aware
of. For n > 2, there are multiple equilibria. Selecting the equilibrium that maximizes
firm profits we show that a larger consideration set (a larger number of firms) relaxes
competition. The explanation of this result is related to consumers’ initial probability of
buying the product of a single firm and, hence, the probability of facing the price of a
single firm. We receive that this probability is decreasing in n. Since loss aversion in the
price dimension is increasing in this probability, it follows that loss aversion in the price
dimension becomes less pronounced as n increases which reduces the pro–competitive
effect of loss aversion (renders price comparisons less effective as n increases). In this
light, product proliferation can be interpreted as a means to make price comparisons less
successful and therefore less relevant. Moreover, when we interpret targeted advertising
to consist in decreasing the seize of consumers’ consideration set, we find that if firms
coordinate on the equilibrium that maximizes industry profits, they would be better off
from jointly agreeing not to use targeted advertising since targeted advertising intensifies
competition.
In our modeling effort, we follow Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008), who also consider en-
dogenous reference points in a market setting. Our model is enriched by considering
heterogeneous consumers who differ according to their knowledge of their preferences
when they form their (probabilistic) reference point. Our framework has two distinguish-
ing features: First, consumers and firms know the market environment; in particular, firms
know the actual (possibly asymmetric) cost realizations.5 Second, consumers learn posted
prices before they form their reference points. Due to this timing, our duopoly model de-
livers unique equilibrium predictions.6
5This allows us to compare our results with those in the standard Hotelling–Salop setting. By contrast,
in Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008), costs may be private information.
6In Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008), consumers form their reference points before knowing posted prices.
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In a related paper, Zhou (2011) considers competitive effects of consumer loss aversion
when consumers do not base reference points on expectations but on past observations of
firms’ prices and product matches. In his paper, the firm visited first (the prominent firm)
may attract an excessive market share with loss–averse consumers, while in our model,
the firm setting the lower price may do so. An advantage of our setup is that prominence
arises endogenously due to reference pricing, whereas, in Zhou (2011), prominence is
exogenous.
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2010) and Spiegler (2011b) investigate monopoly models with
consumer loss aversion. In Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2010)’s setting consumers are loss–
averse with respect to prices and reservation utility from purchase and the monopolist
initially commits to a price distribution depending on cost realizations. They show that
consumer loss aversion with expectation–based reference points provides a rationale for
sticky regular prices and variable sales for frequently purchased goods. Spiegler (2011b)
reproduces their main result by using a simpler, sampling-based reference concept. Fur-
thermore, he finds that loss aversion lowers expected monopoly prices and that sticky–
price equilibria are more likely to arise when uncertainty stems from demand shocks
rather than from costs shocks.
Herweg, Mueller, and Weinschenk (2010) and Herweg and Mierendorff (forthcoming) have
applied the expectation–based loss aversion concept of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007)
to agency models. More broadly, our paper contributes to the literature on behavioral
industrial organization, as surveyed in Ellison (2006), DellaVigna (2009), and Spiegler
(2011a). An important issue in our paper, as in Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), is the compar-
ative statics effects in the composition of the population. In their model this composition
effect is behavioral in the sense that the share of consumers with a particular behavioral
pattern changes. We do not resort to this interpretation, although our analysis is com-
patible with it: We allow the composition effect to be informational in the sense that the
arrival of information in the consumer population is changed (while the whole popula-
tion is subject to the same behavioral pattern). The informational interpretation lends
Hence, firms can deviate from consumers expectations about prices. This creates a discontinuity in con-
sumers’ marginal gain–loss utility and yields to a kinked demand curve at the expected price. The kinked
demand curve leads to a non-response of prices for some cost interval (focal prices) and a multiplicity of
equilibria.
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itself naturally to addressing questions about the effect of early information disclosure to
additional consumers.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the economics of advertising—for a survey on
the economics of advertising see Bagwell (2007). It belongs to the strand that consider ad-
vertising as “hard” information; in this sense we consider directly informative advertising.
Our paper uncovers the role of content advertising as consumer expectation management,
which provides a complementary view to Anderson and Renault (2006). Since, at the
point of purchase, consumers are fully informed there is no role for content advertising
at the purchasing stage. Content advertising, however, can remove the uncertainty con-
sumers face at the ex ante stage—i.e., when forming their reference point—and can be
seen as a hybrid form of informative and persuasive advertising: It changes preferences
at the point of purchase which corresponds to the persuasive view of advertising albeit
due to information that is received ex ante which corresponds to the informative view of
advertising. It also points to the importance of the timing of advertising: For expecta-
tion management via advertising, it is important to inform consumers prior to forming
their reference points.7 Our second extension also connects to the literature on targeted
advertising, as will be spelled out in Section 4.
Our paper can be seen as complementary to the work on consumer search in product
markets—see, e.g., Varian (1980), Anderson and Renault (2000), Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez
(2004), Armstrong and Chen (2009). Whereas that literature focuses on the effect of dif-
ferential information (and consumer search) at the purchasing stage, our paper abstracts
from this issue and focuses on the effect of differential information at the expectation-
formation stage which is relevant if consumers are loss–averse.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the baseline model and
establish the benchmark result that a larger share of informed consumers leads to lower
prices. We then allow for different degrees of consumer loss aversion in the price and the
7Other marketing activities can also be understood as making consumers informed at the stage when
they form their reference point. For instance, test drives for cars or lending out furniture, stereo equip-
ment, and the like make consumers informed early on. Arguably, in reality, uncertainty may not be fully
resolved even at the purchasing stage. However, to focus our minds, we only consider the role of mar-
keting activities on expectation formation before purchase. In short, in our model firms may use market-
ing to manage expectations of loss–averse consumers at an early stage. For a complementary view, see
Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cunat (2010).
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match value dimension. In Section 3, we allow for cost asymmetries between firms in the
baseline model. In Section 4, we allow for any finite number of firms in the benchmark
model and link this to the size of the consideration sets of consumers. Section 5 provides
some further discussion and Section 6 concludes. Some of the proofs are relegated to
Appendix A. Tables of numerical illustration are contained in Appendix B. Appendix C
contains relegated material on equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Appendix D con-
tains the derivation of demand in the n-firm oligopoly. Appendix E contains an extension
in which consumers receive noisy signals about their match value ex ante, as discussed in
Section 5.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a duopoly market in which firm i = 1, 2 incurs a constant marginal cost of pro-
duction ci = c. Firms are located on a circle of length 2 with maximum distance, y1 = 0,
y2 = 1. Firms simultaneously announce prices pi to all consumers. We consider hori-
zontally differentiated products a` la Salop (1979). A continuum of loss-averse consumers
of mass 1 are uniformly distributed on the circle of length 2. A consumer’s location x,
x ∈ [0, 2), represents her taste parameter. Her taste is initially—i.e., before she forms her
reference point—known only to herself if she belongs to the set of informed consumers.
In our model, consumers’ differential information applies to the date at which consumers
determine their reference point and not to the date of purchase: A fraction (1 − β) of
loss–averse consumers, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, is initially uninformed about their taste. As will
be detailed below, they endogenously determine their reference point and then, before
making their purchasing decision, observe their taste parameter (which then becomes
private information of each consumer). At the moment of purchase all consumers are
perfectly informed about product characteristics, prices, and tastes. All consumers have
the same reservation value v for an ideal variety and have unit demand. Their utility from
not buying is −∞ so that the market is fully covered.
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We could alternatively consider competition on the Hotelling line. Our circle model is,
in terms of market outcomes, equivalent to the Hotelling model in which consumers are
uniformly distributed on the [0, 1]-interval and firms are located at the extreme points
of the interval. However, the circle model allows for an n-firm extension and for an
alternative and equivalent interpretation about the type of information some consumers
initially lack: At the point in time consumers form their reference–point distribution, they
all know their taste parameters, but only a fraction (1 − β) does not know the location
of the firms—these uninformed consumers only know that the two firms are located at
maximal distance.
Various justifications for differential information at the ex–ante stage can be given. For in-
stance, consumers may differ by their experience concerning the relevant product feature:
Some may have previously bought the product, whereas others are new on the market.
Alternatively, a share of consumers may know that they will be subject to a taste shock
between forming their reference point and making their purchasing decision. These con-
sumers then do not condition their reference point on the ex–ante taste parameter, whereas
those belonging to the remaining share do.
To determine the market demand faced by the two firms, let the informed consumer type
in [0, 1], who is indifferent between buying good 1 and good 2, be denoted by xˆ(p1, p2).
Correspondingly, the indifferent uninformed consumer is denoted by ˆxˆ(p1, p2). Since
market shares on [0, 1] and [1, 2] are symmetric, the firms’ profits are:
π1(p1, p2) = (p1 − c1)[β · xˆ(p1, p2) + (1 − β) · ˆxˆ(p1, p2)]
π2(p1, p2) = (p2 − c2)[β · (1 − xˆ(p1, p2)) + (1 − β) · (1 − ˆxˆ(p1, p2))].
The timing of events is as follows.
Stage 1.) Price setting: Firms simultaneously set prices (p1, p2).
Stage 2.) Contextual reference point formation: All consumers observe prices and
a) informed consumers observe their taste x (for them uncertainty is resolved),
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b) uninformed consumers form reference–point distributions over purchase price
and match value (as detailed in Subsection 2.2 below.)
Stage 3.) Inspection: Uninformed consumers observe their taste x—i.e., uncertainty is re-
solved for all consumers.
Purchasing: Consumers decide which product to buy:
a) informed consumers make their purchase decisions;
b) (ex–ante) uninformed consumers make their purchase decisions, based on
their utility that includes realized gains and losses relative to their reference–
point distribution.
We solve for subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium where firms foresee that uninformed
consumers play a personal equilibrium (at stages 2b and 3b). Personal equilibrium in
our context means that consumers hold rational expectation about their final purchasing
decision and behave according to them in equilibrium—for the general formalization, see
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
2.2 Consumer demand in the baseline model
2.2.1 Demand of informed consumers
Informed consumers ex ante observe prices and their taste parameter and, therefore, do
not face any uncertainty when forming their reference point. Hence, their behavior ex
post is only influenced by consumers’ expected behavior ex ante (buy from firm 1 with
probability one and face match x and price p1 or buy from firm 2 with probability one
and face match 1 − x and price p2). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) show (in their Proposition
3) that, in such an environment, it is preferable for consumers from an ex–ante point of
view to hold initial plans which maximize their intrinsic utility and to follow through
these plans in equilibrium (preferred personal equilibrium).8 Therefore their behavior is
8The intuition behind this result is the following: In environments without uncertainty, there exists a
continuum of initial plans (around the cutoff xˆ) which consumers will follow through ex post (personal
equilibria). Since none of these plans will induce a net loss ex post, it is optimal for consumers to initially
choose the plan which maximizes their intrinsic utility.
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the same as in the standard Hotelling-Salop model. For prices p1 and p2, an informed
consumer located at x obtains the indirect utility ui(x, pi) = v − t|yi − x| − pi from buying
product i, where t scales the disutility from distance between ideal and actual taste on
the circle. The expression v − t|yi − x| then captures the match value of product i for a
consumer of type x. Denote the indifferent (informed) consumer between buying from
firm 1 and 2 on the first half of the circle by xˆ ∈ [0, 1]. The informed (interior) indifferent
consumer is
xˆ(p1, p2) = (t + p2 − p1)2t . (1)
Symmetrically, a second indifferent (informed) consumer type is located at 2− xˆ(p1, p2) ∈
[1, 2]. Using symmetry and the uniform distribution of x, we receive that firm 1’s demand
of informed consumers is equal to xˆ(p1, p2).
2.2.2 Demand of uninformed consumers
Uninformed consumers do not know their ideal taste x ex ante and, thus, are ex ante un-
certain as to which product they will buy after learning their ideal taste x: They, therefore,
face ex ante uncertainty in the price and match–value dimension and form reference–point
distributions in these two dimensions.
Three properties of consumer behavior are worthwhile pointing out. First, consumers
have gains or losses not about net utilities but about each product “characteristic”, where
price is then treated as a product characteristic. This is in line with much of the experimen-
tal evidence on the endowment effect—for a discussion, see, for instance, Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006).9 Second, consumers evaluate a given product by comparing it to their reference
point. Due to rational expectations this reference point may depend on the rival’s product
characteristics. Third, we assume here that the gain–loss parameters are the same across
dimensions.
9Gains and losses also matter in the price dimension because, even though prices are deterministic,
they can be different across firms. Hence, a consumer who initially does not know her taste parameter is
uncertain at this point in time about the price at which she will buy.
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The uninformed consumer will buy from firm 2 if she is located close enough to firm
2—i.e., if x ∈ [ ˆxˆ(p1, p2), 2 − ˆxˆ(p1, p2)], where ˆxˆ(p1, p2) is the location of the indifferent
(uninformed) consumer we want to characterize. Hence, the uninformed consumer at x
will pay p2 in equilibrium with Prob[p = p2] = Prob[ ˆxˆ(p1, p2) < x < 2− ˆxˆ(p1, p2)] and p1
with the complementary probability. Since x is uniformly distributed on [0, 2], we obtain
that from an ex ante perspective p1 is the relevant price with probability Prob[p = p1] = ˆxˆ.
Correspondingly, the purchase at price p2 occurs with probability Prob[p = p2] = 1 − ˆxˆ.
This defines the reference–point distribution with respect to the purchase price p. The
reference–point distribution with respect to the match value refers to the reservation value
v minus the distance between ideal and actual product variety, s ∈ [0, 1], times the taste
parameter t. The density of the probability distribution of the distance is denoted by g(s) =
Prob(|x− yσ| = s), where the location of the firm is yσ ∈ {0, 1}, and the consumer x’s pur-
chase strategy in personal equilibrium for given prices is σ ∈ arg max j∈{1,2} u j(x, p j, p− j).10
The corresponding cumulative distribution function is denoted by G(s).
Consider the case ˆxˆ ≥ 1/2—i.e., p1 ≤ p2 so that firm 1 has a weakly larger market
share than firm 2 also for uninformed consumers. Since at p1 , p2 some uninformed
consumers will not buy from their nearest firm, g(s) is a step function with support [0, ˆxˆ].
The discontinuity of g on (0, ˆxˆ) is determined by the maximum distance that consumers
are willing to accept buying the more expensive product 2, s = 1 − ˆxˆ, as s ≤ 1 − ˆxˆ holds
for consumers close to either 1 or 2, while s > 1 − ˆxˆ only holds for the more distant
consumers of 1. Hence, the density function takes the form
g(s) =

2 if s ∈ [0, 1 − ˆxˆ]
1 if s ∈ (1 − ˆxˆ, ˆxˆ]
0 otherwise.
Analogously, for the case ˆxˆ < 1/2.
After uncertainty is resolved, consumers experience a gain–loss utility: The reference–
10σ is a function of prices and consumer’s location x conditional on consumer’s expectation about equi-
librium outcomes which are incorporated in their two-dimensional reference–point distribution. σ states a
consumer’s personal equilibrium. This equilibrium concept was introduced by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)
and requires that behavior-generating expectations must be self-fulfilling in equilibrium.
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point distribution is split up for each dimension at the value of realization in a loss part
with weight λ > 1 and a gain part with weight 1. In the loss part the realized value is
compared to the lower tail of the reference–point distribution; in the gain part it is com-
pared to the upper tail of the reference–point distribution. Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006), we assume in this section a universal gain-loss function for all dimensions. For
p1 ≤ p2, the indirect utility of an uninformed consumer x ∈ (1 − ˆxˆ, 1] purchasing product
1 is then given by11
u1(x, p1, p2) =(v − tx − p1) − λ · Prob[p = p1](p1 − p1) + Prob[p = p2](p2 − p1)
− λ · t
∫ x
0
(x − s)dG(s) + t
∫ 1
x
(s − x)dG(s). (2)
The first term on the right-hand side reflects the consumer’s intrinsic utility from prod-
uct 1. The remaining terms capture the two hedonic dimensions in which consumers
experience gains and losses. The second term captures the loss in the price (or money)
dimension from not facing a lower price than p1. This term is equal to zero because p1
is the lowest price offered in the market place. The third term is the gain from not facing
a higher price than p1, which is positive. Note that this gain is weighted by the proba-
bility of the complementary event (buying from firm 2). Intuitively, the realized gain in
the price dimension is the larger the higher was the probability of facing the higher price
p2 at the initial stage. The last two terms correspond to the loss (gain) from not facing a
smaller (larger) distance in the taste or match-value dimension than x. Analogously, an
uninformed consumer’s indirect utility from a purchase of product 2 at p2 ≥ p1 is given
by
u2(x, p1, p2) = v − t(1 − x) − p2︸              ︷︷              ︸
Intrinsic utility
−λ · Prob[p = p1](p2 − p1)︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
Loss from facing a higher p than p1
−λ · t
∫ 1−x
0
((1 − x) − s)dG(s)︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Loss due to expecting smaller distance than 1−x
+ t
∫ 1
1−x
(s − (1 − x))dG(s)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
Gain due to expecting larger distance than 1−x
(3)
11The indifferent uninformed consumer will be located at x = ˆxˆ. Therefore, (1 − ˆxˆ, 1] is the relevant
interval for determining ˆxˆ for ∆p ≡ p2 − p1 ≥ 0.
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This allows us to solve a consumer’s personal equilibrium by determining the location
of the indifferent uninformed consumer ˆxˆ, which is implicitly given by u1( ˆxˆ, p1, p2) =
u2( ˆxˆ, p1, p2). Let us focus on the first half of the circle and let firm 1 be the cheaper
firm—i.e., x ∈ [0, 1] and p2 > p1.
Lemma 1. Suppose that ∆p ≡ p2− p1 ≥ 0, x ∈ [0, 1], and λ ∈ (1, λc] with λc = 3+2
√
5 ≈
7.47. Then ˆxˆ is given by
ˆxˆ(∆p) =
 λ/(λ − 1) − ∆p/(4t) − S (∆p), if ∆p ∈ [0,∆p˜];1, if ∆p > ∆p˜. (4)
where ∆p˜ ≡ (λ + 3)t/(2(λ + 1)) < t and
S (∆p) =
√
∆p2
16t2 −
(λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)∆p +
(λ + 1)2
4(λ − 1)2 . (5)
We relegate the proof of this lemma to Appendix A. For x ∈ [0, 1] and ∆p ≥ 0, the unique
pure–strategy personal equilibrium of consumer x is described by
σ(x,∆p) =

1 if x ∈ [0, ˆxˆ(∆p)]
2 if x ∈ ( ˆxˆ(∆p), 1].
By symmetry and the uniform distribution of x on the circle, firm 1’s demand of unin-
formed consumers is equal to ˆxˆ(∆p).12 Note that ˆxˆ(0) = 1/2. If ∆p < 0, the location of
the indifferent uninformed consumer is given by 1 − ˆxˆ(−∆p) by symmetry.
12The square root S (∆p) is defined for ∆p ∈ [0,∆p¯] with
∆p¯ ≡ 2t(λ − 1)
(
2(λ + 2) −
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
. (6)
∆p¯ ≥ ∆p˜ for λ ∈ (1, λc]. However, for λ > λc a critical price difference such that λ/(λ − 1) − ∆p/(4t) −
S (∆p) = 1 does not exist and we obtain a discontinuous jump up to one at ∆p¯. For the sake of brevity we
restrict attention to the case of λ ∈ (1, λc] in the following.
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2.2.3 Comparison between the demand of uninformed and informed consumers
How do ˆxˆ(∆p) and xˆ(∆p) compare with one another? We can show that, for λ → 1,
the indirect utility function of uninformed consumers differs from the one of informed
consumers only by a constant and we obtain ˆxˆ(∆p) = xˆ(∆p) as a solution in this case.
Let us compare the sensitivity of uninformed consumers’ demand with respect to price to
the one of informed consumers. To do so, we define the critical price difference
∆pˆ =
t
(
2
√
2 · (2(λ + 2)) − 3 ·
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
√
2(λ − 1)
.
We obtain the following result:
Lemma 2. The demand of uninformed (or loss–averse) consumers is less price sensitive
than the demand of informed consumers if the price difference is sufficiently small, ∆p ∈
[0,∆pˆ). The demand of uninformed (or loss–averse) consumers is more price sensitive
than the demand of informed consumers if the price difference is large, ∆p ∈ (∆pˆ,∆p˜].
The proof of the Lemma 2 is relegated to Appendix A. Demand for uninformed vs.
informed consumers is illustrated in Figure 1.13 In Section 3, we will see that this property
is a driving force for our comparative static results in asymmetric markets. We note that,
at a small price difference, the indifferent uninformed loss–averse consumer is harder to
attract than an informed consumer by a price decrease by firm 1 because the consumer’s
net gain in the price dimension from buying at a lower price is outweighed by her net
loss in the taste dimension if buying the more distant product 1. Thus, demand of loss–
averse consumers reacts less sensitive to price in this range. The net gain and net loss in
the two dimensions are equal to (λ − 1)∆p ˆxˆ(∆p) (see the difference between the second
term in (20) and (21)) and −(λ− 1)t(1/2− 2(1− ˆxˆ(∆p))2), respectively (see the difference
between the third term in (20) and (21)). Here the net gain in the price dimension is
increasing and the net loss in the taste dimension is decreasing in ∆p. Moreover, both
13We restrict attention to price differences such that the indifferent consumers are strictly interior. For
larger price differences ∆p ∈ [∆p˜, t], ˆxˆ(∆p) = 1, while xˆ(∆p) ≤ 1. Then more care is needed, as is applied
in Section 3.
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Location of the indifferent informed and uninformed consumer (= demand of firm 1)
as a function of ∆p for parameter values of t = 1 and λ = 3; thus, ∆p˜ = 3/4 and
∆pˆ = 0.2789.
Figure 1: Demand of informed and uninformed consumers
functions are convex in ∆p. For larger price differences, ˆxˆ(∆p) ∈ [1/2, 1] is larger and
a marginal increase in ∆p increases the net gain in the price dimension more than for
small price differences, while the net loss in the taste dimension decreases less than at
lower price differences since 1 − ˆxˆ(∆p) is closer to zero than to 1/2. The intuition for
this finding is that, for larger price differences, the consumer is less likely to buy from
the more expensive firm 2 and, thus, the avoided loss in the price dimension if not doing
so ex post becomes larger. This effect dominates the reduced gain in the price dimension
of buying from the cheaper firm 1 ex post which is caused by the higher probability of
buying from firm 1. In addition, assigning a higher probability of buying from the more
distant firm 1 leads to an expected taste difference which reduces the consumer’s loss
in the taste dimension if doing so ex post. Thus, the indifferent uninformed consumer
as a function of the price difference is convex. For sufficiently large asymmetries, the
indifferent informed consumer is closer to the center than her uninformed counterpart.
Thus, the low-price firm is better able to serve uninformed than informed consumers and
it becomes “prominent´´ among uninformed consumers.
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2.3 Equilibrium and comparative statics
Our framework allows us to explicitly solve for equilibrium markup in symmetric duopoly,
in contrast to Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008). The following lemma characterizes the sym-
metric equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Any equilibrium is unique and symmetric. Equilibrium prices are given by
p∗i = c +
t
1 − (1−β)2 (λ−1)(λ+1)
, i = 1, 2. (7)
Proof. Rearranging the first-order conditions of profit maximization and using that qi(0; β) =
1/2 for all β, we obtain
p∗i − c =
1
2
q′i(0; β)
, i = 1, 2, (8)
where
q′i(0; β) = −
1
4t
(1 − 3β) − (1 − β)
2(S (0))
(
0 − (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
= − 1
4t
(1 − 3β) + (1 − β)
2 λ+12(λ−1)
( (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
=
1
4t(λ + 1)
(
2(λ + 1) − (1 − β)(λ − 1)
)
.
Substituting into equation (8) yields the unique symmetric equilibrium price in (7). 
As shown in Appendix C.1, for all β a symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if
1 < λ ≤ λc ≡ 1 + 2
√
2 ≈ 3.828 (9)
In the existence proof, we have to deal with the fact that profit functions are not globally
quasi-concave, since the low–price firm’s profit becomes increasingly convex due to the
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increasing convexity of its demand with loss-averse consumers. This violation of quasi-
concavity reflects that the low–price firm may have an incentive to non-locally undercut to
gain the entire demand of loss-averse consumers when the initial situation has the property
that ∆p is large. To deal with the non–quasi–concavity of the profit function of the low–
price firm, we determine critical levels for the degree of loss aversion such that no firm
has an incentive to non-locally undercut. There we use that the convexity of the low–price
firm’s profit function is increasing in ∆p which yields that stealing the entire demand of
loss-averse consumers is the only potentially optimal deviation of the low–price firm.
We define the equilibrium markup as m∗ ≡ p∗−c. Using Lemma 3, we obtain comparative
static results. In particular, as the share of informed consumers increases, each firm’s
markup decreases. This result follows directly from differentiating (7) with respect to β:
Proposition 1. For λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2], equilibrium markup is decreasing in the share of
informed consumers β.
In other words, uninformed loss-averse consumers exert a negative external effect on in-
formed consumers. This contrasts the findings of a positive external effect in Gabaix and Laibson
(2006) who consider a market in which only a fraction of consumers are knowledgeable
about their future demand of an “add-on service”, while other consumers are “naively”
unaware of this.
For illustration, Table 1 reports equilibrium markups for different values of the share of
informed consumers β and of the degree of loss aversion λ. At the upper bound of λ, λ =
λc, the equilibrium markup reaches its maximum level of 1.414 when all consumers are
loss averse. This level lies 41.4% above the level with informed (or standard) consumers.
2.4 A More Flexible Symmetric Duopoly Model
So far we imposed symmetry across the price and match value dimension. In particular,
we postulated that the degrees of loss aversion are the same in the two dimensions. In
this subsection, we allow for different degrees of loss aversion λp, λm ≥ 1 in the two
dimensions and verify that loss aversion in each of the two dimensions has a different
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Table 1: Symmetric Equilibrium: Markups
β λ 1 2 3 3.8284 5 7
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1.03448 1.05263 1.06222 1.07143 1.08108
0.6 1 1.07143 1.11111 1.1327 1.15385 1.17647
0.4 1 1.11111 1.17647 1.2132 1.25 1.29032
0.2 1 1.15385 1.25 1.30602 1.36364 -
0 1 1.2 1.33333 1.41421 - -
impact on competition: in line with the insights of Lemma 2, we find that, in equilibrium,
loss aversion in the price dimension is pro–competitive whereas loss aversion in the taste
dimension is anti–competitive. For the sake of brevity, we only consider β ∈ {0, 1}.
Extending the expression in (2), the indirect utility of buying product 1 is written as
u1(x, p1, p2; λp, λm) =(v − tx − p1)
+ ·
(
− λp · Prob[p = p1](p1 − p1) + Prob[p = p2](p2 − p1)
)
+
(
− λm · t
∫ x
0
(x − s)dG(s) + t
∫ 1
x
(s − x)dG(s)
)
.
We find that firm i’s demand in duopoly is given by
ˆxˆi(∆p) = λm(λm − 1) −
(λp − 1)
4(λm − 1)t∆p − S (∆p), (10)
where
S (∆p) =
√
(λp − 1)2∆p2 − 8(λm(λm + 1) − 2)t∆p + 4(λm + 1)2t2
16(λm − 1)2t2 (11)
for λp, λm > 1 and ∆p ≥ 0 (and the latter not too large). In Figure 2, we illustrate
the demand of loss-averse consumers (with different degrees of loss aversion in the two
dimensions).
If loss aversion in the price dimension becomes relatively more pronounced (dashed line
in Figure 2), then the price sensitivity of demand increases relative to the standard case
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Duopoly demand of standard and loss-averse consumers as a function of ∆p for pa-
rameter values of t = 1: xˆ1(∆p) = ˆxˆ1(∆p|λp = 1, λm → 1) : dotted, ˆxˆ1(∆p|λp =
1, λm = 3) : solid, and ˆxˆ1(∆p|λp = 3, λm → 1) : dashed.
Figure 2: Demand with different degrees of loss aversion in the two dimensions
(dotted line). The opposite holds true if loss aversion in the taste dimension becomes
relatively more pronounced (solid line).
Equilibrium prices are derived analogously to Lemma 3. For β = 0, we obtain
p∗i = c +
2(λm + 1)t
λp + 3
, i = 1, 2, (12)
provided a pure-strategy equilibrium exists. In Appendix C.2 we provide conditions for
equilibrium existence for this case. Holding λp fixed, we observe that increasing the
degree of loss aversion in the match–value dimension increases the equilibrium markup
and, thus, relaxes competition. By contrast, holding λm fixed, we observe that increasing
the degree of loss aversion in the price dimension decreases the equilibrium markup and,
thus, intensifies competition.
Comparing markups in (7) (for β = 1) and (12), it follows that making loss-averse con-
sumers informed is competitively neutral if
λp = 2λm − 1. (13)
As Figure 3 illustrates, informing consumers is always pro–competitive in the baseline
model where λp = λm. However, if the degree of loss aversion is sufficiently strong in
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Figure 3: Pro- and anti–competitive effects of loss aversion
the price dimension relative to the match value dimension the overall implication is the
reverse—i.e., competition is more intense when all consumers are ex–ante uninformed
and loss-averse. We summarize our finding as follows:
Proposition 2. Suppose that all consumers experience losses in the price dimension dif-
ferently to those in the match–value dimension, λp , λm and λp, λm ≥ 1. If λp > 2λm − 1,
the equilibrium price increases in the share of ex–ante informed consumers β ∈ [0, 1]. If
the reverse inequality holds strictly, the equilibrium price decreases.
Proof. In the main text we showed this result for the discrete change from β = 0 to β = 1.
It remains to be shown that our findings in the text extend to the case with β ∈ (0, 1)]. The
equilibrium markup in duopoly is one half divided by the first derivative of the demand
function at ∆p = 0; compare (8). Note that the demand function is strictly increasing in
∆p. If the first derivative of the demand with uninformed consumers and flexible weights
is weakly higher (resp. weakly lower) than the demand with informed consumers, then
the first derivative of any convex combination of the two demand functions is as well.
Thus, the result for any local increase of β with β ∈ [0, 1). 
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3 Cost Asymmetries
In this section, we consider asymmetric markets and provide comparative statics results
with respect to β, the share of initially informed consumers. In other words, we investigate
the effects of ex ante match information on market outcomes in markets with asymmetric
marginal costs c1 ≤ c2.
We obtain the market demand of firm 1 as the weighted sum of the demand by informed
and uninformed consumers,
q1(∆p; β) = β · xˆ(∆p) + (1 − β) · ˆxˆ(∆p)
≡ φ(∆p; β)
The demand of firm 1 is a function of the price difference ∆p, which is kinked at ∆p˜ =
(λ+3)t/(2(λ+1)) with ∆p˜ < t for λ > 1. Furthermore, it approaches one as ∆p approaches
t.14 Firm 2’s demand is determined analogously by q2(∆p; β) = 1 − q1(∆p; β). We focus
on interior equilibria in which both products are purchased by a strictly positive share of
uninformed consumers—i.e., ∆p is less than ∆p˜. This holds in industries in which firms
are not too asymmetric.
The derivative of firm 1’s demand with respect to β expresses how demand changes as
the share of ex–ante informed consumers is increased. It is the difference between the
demand of informed and uninformed consumers:
∂φ(∆p; β)
∂β
≡ φβ = xˆ(∆p) − ˆxˆ(∆p) = 34t∆p −
λ + 1
2(λ − 1) + S (∆p) ≷ 0,
with φβ = 0 at ∆p = 0 and ∆p = t/2. This derivative can be of positive or negative sign.
As the following lemma implies, demand is decreasing in own price and increasing in the
competitor’s price.
14At ∆p = t, firm 1 serves also all distant informed consumers which are harder to attract than distant
uninformed consumers because the former do not perceive an overwhelming loss in the price dimension if
buying from the more expensive firm 2. At ∆p = t, the demand of firm 1 has another kink. We ignore the
region ∆p > t since we are interested in cases in which both firms face strictly positive demand.
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Lemma 4. For β < 1, the demand of firm 1, q1(∆p; β) = φ(∆p; β), is strictly increasing
and convex in ∆p for 0 ≤ ∆p ≤ ∆p˜.
The proof follows directly from the properties of ˆxˆ and xˆ in Section 2. In the remainder,
we often refer to φ as a short-hand notation for φ(∆p; β). The derivative ∂φ/∂(∆p) is
denoted by φ′.
At the first stage, firms foresee consumers’ purchase decisions and set prices simultane-
ously to maximize profits. This yields first-order conditions
∂πi
∂pi
= qi + (pi − ci) ∂qi∂pi = 0 , i = A, B
If the solution has the feature that demand of each group of consumers, informed and
uninformed, is strictly positive, first-order conditions can be written as
∂π1
∂p1
= φ − (p1 − c1)φ′ = 0 (FOC1)
∂π2
∂p2
= (1 − φ) − (p2 − c2)φ′ = 0. (FOC2)
We refer to a solution characterized by these first-order conditions as an interior solution.
Since the profit function of the low-cost firm is not quasi-concave, we cannot use standard
results to establish equilibrium existence.15 We rule out non-interior solutions and show
equilibrium existence in Appendix C.3. In asymmetric markets, existence requires an
adjustment of the upper bound of the degree of loss aversion to cost differences.
We now turn to the characterization of interior equilibria (p∗1, p∗2).
Lemma 5. In an interior asymmetric equilibrium with equilibrium prices (p∗1, p∗2), the
15Anderson and Renault (2009) face an, at first glance, similar fixed point problem. They consider a
general differentiated product Bertrand duopoly with covered markets in which asymmetries arise due to
quality differences between firms. The authors show uniqueness and existence of a pure–strategy price
equilibrium under the assumption of strict log-concavity of firms’ demand. Although strict log-concavity
allows for some convexity of demand, in our setup this property is not met since for large price differences
and a high degree of loss aversion the convexity of the low-price firm’s demand rises above any bound—i.e.,
φ′′(∆p) → ∞ for ∆p → ∆p˜ and λ → λc.
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price difference ∆p∗ = p∗2 − p∗1 satisfies
∆p∗ = ∆c + f (∆p∗; β), (14)
where ∆c = c2 − c1 and f (∆p; β) = (1 − 2φ)/φ′.
Proof. Combining (FOC1) and (FOC2) yields the required equilibrium condition as a
function of price differences. 
Thus, (14) implicitly defines the equilibrium price difference ∆p∗ as a function of the
parameters ∆c, β, λ, and t, where the latter two parameters affect the functional form of f
via φ.
For any ∆c > 0, it is not possible to obtain explicit analytical solutions to equilibrium
prices—see Appendix B for numerical solutions at particular parameter values. Never-
theless, we obtain the following analytical comparative statics results.
Proposition 3. Suppose that firm 1 is the more efficient firm, c1 < c2.
a) The equilibrium price difference ∆p∗(β) is decreasing in the share of informed con-
sumers β.
b) The equilibrium price of the low-cost firm p∗1(β) is monotone or inversely U-shaped in
the share of informed consumers β. In particular, p∗1(β) may be globally increasing
in β.
c) The equilibrium price of the high-cost firm p∗2(β) is monotone or inversely U-shaped in
the share of informed consumers β. In particular, p2∗(β) may be globally increasing
in β.
The proof is relegated to the Appendix A. In the following, we discuss the implications
of this proposition. Price tends to be decreasing in β for a small cost difference (since the
markup is higher with uninformed, loss–averse consumers in this case) and increasing for
a large cost difference (since the markup is lower with uninformed, loss–averse consumers
in this case). In addition, a larger share of uninformed, loss–averse consumers leads to
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a larger price difference.16 We observe that, in strongly asymmetric markets, lack of ex–
ante information amplifies the asymmetry in market share and price between firms. In
other words, relative price and market share of the “prominent” firm is larger than in
a setting in which consumers are fully informed ex ante. This implies that, with loss–
averse consumers, setting a low price (and making consumers aware of this) provides
a means for a low–cost firm to become prominent in a market—compare the literature
on prominence in search markets, in particular, Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009).
Possible examples are the presence of private labels in the food or non–food grocery
industry in the U.S. (Steiner 2004, p. 115) or of low–cost holiday trip providers such as
Neckermann in Europe.
Firms have to trade–off the business–stealing effect with the effect on the profit margin.
This trade-off is affected by the share of informed consumers which, in many markets, can
be considered to be increasing over time. We find that the price of the high–margin (i.e.,
low–cost) firm is monotone (i.e., globally increasing or decreasing) or inverse U-shaped in
β, depending on the parameter constellation:17 in strongly asymmetric markets (when the
effect of loss aversion is pro–competitive) the price of the low–cost firm may be increasing
over time if more consumers become informed as the market matures. In these markets,
we predict that a low–cost firm prefers to use low introductory prices. This describes a
novel rationale for low introductory prices in the absence of quality differences. This is
distinct from the classical result in Nelson (1970) where low introductory prices signal
high product quality and other explanations on dynamic consumer behavior. By contrast,
the price of the low–cost firm decreases over time in moderately asymmetric markets
16This is in contrast to one of the main findings in Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) who show that, in their
setting, consumer loss aversion is a rationale for focal prices. In Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) consumers
do not observe prices before forming their two-dimensional reference–point distribution. Firms therefore
can deviate from consumers expectations about prices. This creates a discontinuity in consumers’ marginal
gain–loss utility and yields to a kinked demand curve at the expected price. The kinked demand curve leads
to price rigidities for some cost interval and a multiplicity of equilibria. This discontinuity does not arise
in our duopoly model since prices are observed ex ante and consumers hold correct expectations also off
equilibrium. In absence of consumer loss aversion, firms would condition prices on their marginal costs.
Using our terminology, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi compare a setting with mass 1 of uninformed consumers—
i.e., β = 0, to a setting with mass 0 of uninformed consumers, which corresponds to a world without
consumer loss aversion. The message by Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) is that consumer loss aversion tends
to lead to (more) equal prices; our finding, by contrast, says that consumer loss aversion leads to a larger
price difference in a market with asymmetric firms.
17For instance, Krishnan, Bass, and Jain (1999) report that price of color TVs and clothes dryers are
either monotonically declining or show an increase–decrease pricing pattern.
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Equilibrium markups of firm 1 and 2 for markets in which either all consumers are
uninformed (β = 0) or informed (=benchmark case, β = 1) as a function of cost
differences ∆c for parameter values of t = 1 and λ = 2.5: ∆cnd(β = 0) = 1.27681.
Figure 4: Equilibrium markup of both firms
(when the effect of loss aversion is anti–competitive). Here, low introductory prices are
not chosen by the low-cost firm.
The findings for the extreme cases β = 0 and β = 1 can be inferred from Figure 4—
compare firm 1’s markups at low, intermediate, and high cost differences. The critical
price difference (that implies the critical cost difference) at which price locally does not
respond to β (c.p. ∆p—i.e., the partial effect) can be solved for analytically. The critical
∆p is a function of λ and t and is independent of β:
∆p| ∂p1
∂β
=0(λ, t) =
t
4(3 + 5λ)
(
(9 − (26 − 15λ)λ) +
√
3 · | − 1 + 5λ|
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ − 1)2
)
For example, for parameters λ = 3 and t = 1 the critical price difference, at which the
price of the low-cost firm reaches its maximum, satisfies ∆p| ∂p1
∂β
=0(3, 1) = 0.2534. It is
also insightful to evaluate the derivative in the limit as β turns to 1. In this case, we can
also solve analytically for a critical ∆p at which the total derivative of p1 is zero—i.e.,
dp∗1(∆p∗(β);β)
dβ = 0:
∆p| dp1
dβ =0
(λ, t) = t3(λ(31λ + 42) − 41) −
√
21 · |7 − 11λ| √(λ + 3)(3λ + 5)
2(λ − 3)(9λ − 1) at β = 1.
In the example, ∆p| dp1
dβ =0
(3, 1) = 7/26 = 0.2692 at β = 1. This means that, given parame-
ters λ = 3 and t = 1, if the equilibrium price difference satisfies ∆p∗(1) < 0.2692 a small
decrease in the share of informed consumers leads to a higher price of the more efficient
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firm, dp∗1/dβ < 0. By contrast, for ∆p∗(1) > 0.2692, the reverse inequality holds—i.e.,
dp∗1/dβ > 0.
For the high-cost firm, our result is qualitatively similar: The price tends to be decreasing
in β for small cost differences and increasing for large cost differences.18
We briefly discuss the firms’ incentives to disclose information—i.e., we investigate the
effect of β on profits. Here, private information disclosure can be seen as the firms’
management of consumer expectations (i.e., reference points). Note that in our simple
setting information disclosure by one firm fully reveals the information of both firms
since consumers make the correct inferences from observing the match value for one of
the two products. We confine attention to a numerical example. The critical value of
∆p such that dπ1/dβ = 0 at β = 1 and λ = 3 and t = 1, c1 = 0.25, and c2 = 1 is
∆p = 0.2581. The critical value of ∆p such that dπ2/dβ = 0 at the same parameter values
as above is ∆p = 0.2870. The critical value at β = 1 is ∆p∗(1) = 0.25 (see Table 3 in
Appendix B). Hence, the critical values of ∆p at β < 1 are larger than ∆p∗(1). Moreover,
∆p| dp2
∂β
=0 > ∆p| dp1
∂β
=0.
Our numerical example shows that there are cases where increasing the initial share of
ex–ante informed consumers, first none, then one and then both of the firms gain from in-
formation disclosure. Since disclosing information about match value to a positive num-
ber of consumers is profitable, such a strategy will be chosen by profit–maximizing firms
(if disclosure is not too costly). This also implies that, for sufficiently large cost asym-
metries, a “prominent” firm might disclose product match information to consumers at an
18With respect to firm 1, we also solve for critical values at which the marginal effect of firm 2’s price
changes sign:
∆p| ∂p2
∂β
=0(λ, t) =
t
2(λ + 1)(λ + 7)
(
(−23 + (λ − 10)λ) + |5 − λ|
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ − 1)2
)
For instance, ∆p| ∂p2
∂β
=0(3, 1) = 0.3201. At β = 1 we can solve analytically for a critical ∆p at which the total
derivative of p2 is zero—i.e., (dp∗2(∆p∗(β); β))/dβ = 0:
∆p| dp2
∂β
=0(λ, t) =
t
(
3(λ(17λ + 6) − 55) − √15 · |11 − 7λ| √(λ + 3)(3λ + 5)
)
4λ(3λ − 11)
We have ∆p| dp2
∂β
=0(3, 1) = 1/2 · (5
√
35 − 29) = 0.2902 at β = 1. Thus, for ∆p∗(1) < 0.2902, we obtain
dp2/dβ < 0 at β = 1 − ǫ, while, for ∆p∗(1) > 0.2902, we obtain dp2/dβ > 0 at β = 1. Thus, the overall
effect of a marginal increase in β can indeed become positive if cost asymmetries are sufficiently large.
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early stage. In this case, the “prominent” firm prefers to give up a higher market share
with uninformed consumers in favor of higher markups with informed consumers. This
result shows that if competition becomes too intense it can become profitable for private
labels (low–cost firms) to disclose product information. Our finding provides a rationale
for truthfully advertising product characteristics at an early stage, although all consumers
would learn them prior to purchase even in the absence of advertising. Without consumer
loss aversion it would be irrelevant for market demand and market outcomes whether or
not a firm advertises product characteristics ex ante.
While the focus of our analysis has been on the effect of a change of the share of ex–ante
informed consumers, we may also want to compare markets with different asymmetries
between firms. For this purpose, we state a comparative statics result with respect to the
degree of cost asymmetry—i.e., the level of ∆c = c2 − c1.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium price difference ∆p∗(∆c, β) is an increasing function of
the cost asymmetry between firms, ∆c. It reacts more sensitive to ∆c than in a market in
which all consumers are informed ex ante, d(∆p∗)/d(∆c) > 1/3 for β > 0.
The proof is relegated to Appendix A.2. Proposition 4 says that the more pronounced the
cost asymmetry the larger the price difference between high-cost and low-cost firm. The
marginal effect of an increase in cost differences on price variation is stronger if some loss-
averse consumers are uninformed. We thus predict exacerbated price variation in markets
with uninformed loss–averse consumers in response to a larger asymmetry. Intuitively,
the more efficient firm (firm 1) is tempted to use consumer expectation management to
increase its market share or prominence: announcing a very low price ex ante makes loss–
averse consumers more reluctant than standard consumers to buy from the less efficient
firm (firm 2) later on.
Finally, we would like to comment on the equilibrium markup of the low-cost firm m∗1(∆c) ≡
p∗1(∆c, c1) − c1. While in the standard Hotelling world with only informed consumers
(β = 1) the markup of the more efficient firm is increasing in the cost difference, a local
increase of the cost difference may have the reverse effect under consumer loss aversion
(β < 1, λ > 1). This holds true in strongly asymmetric markets: The price sensitivity
of demand is larger than in the standard Hotelling world due to the dominating loss in
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the price dimension. We note that, under very large cost differences, firm 1’s markup
might fall below its level in the standard Hotelling world, as has been illustrated in Figure
4—see, also, Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix B.
4 Consideration Sets
In this section, we introduce consideration sets and focus on comparative statics with
respect to the size of this set. To this effect we analyze a symmetric oligopoly. For
expositional reasons, we only consider the situations in which none or all consumers
are ex–ante informed, i. e. β ∈ {0, 1}. We consider comparative statics in the number
of firms in an n-firm oligopoly and argue that this is equivalent to varying the size of
the consideration set for a given number of firms N > n in the industry. Suppose that
the length of the circle is L = n (while the consumer mass is equal to 1); this implies
that the equilibrium markup in the model with standard consumers (as in Salop (1979)) is
independent of the number of firms, as additional firms do not affect the degree of product
differentiation between any direct neighbors. Hence, we are able to isolate the role played
by consumer loss aversion as any change in the equilibrium markup is due to the presence
of consumer loss aversion. Furthermore, we observe that, under the alternative timing
proposed by Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) that consumers form reference points before
observing prices, the set of symmetric equilibrium prices is independent of the number of
firms. The reason is that consumers expect a particular reference point distribution which
is independent of the number of firms as a local price change given these reference points
has the same effect on a firm’s demand independent of the number of firms in the market.
Thus, any comparative statics results in the number of firms are due to the fact that price
changes are observed initially and, thus, affect the reference–point distribution.
As shown in Appendix D, firm i’s demand n ˆxˆi(∆p, p′) for a small price decrease that
does not steal any adjacent market ( ˆxˆi ∈ [1/n, 2/n], pi ≤ p′, and p j = p′ for all j , i;
∆p ≡ p′ − pi) satisfies
ˆxˆi(∆p, p′) =
( 4
(λ − 1)(n + 2) +
3n + 2
n(n + 2)
)
− 2∆p
n(n + 2)t − 2S (∆p), (15)
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where
S (∆p) =
√
∆p2(λ − 1)2 − (λ − 1)(λ(3n + 2) + n(2n + 5) − 2)t∆p + (1 + λ)2n2t2
(λ − 1)2 (2n + n2)2 t2 (16)
for λ > 1 and ∆p ≥ 0 and sufficiently small. Firm i’s demand for a sufficiently small price
increase can be derived analogously. Moreover, its demand for a larger price decrease is
reported in the n–firm existence proof provided in Appendix C.4.
We observe that, at symmetric prices of the firm j , i, firm i’s demand is kinked for n > 2.
This means that demand in oligopoly with more than two firms behaves qualitatively
differently than duopoly demand because setting a slightly lower price than the competitor
leads to a different marginal effect in absolute value than setting a slightly higher price
if there is more than one competitor.19 The kinked demand is illustrated in Figure 5 for
n = 100 (keeping the competitors’ prices fixed at the duopoly equilibrium price p∗(2)).
Due to kinked demand, there is a continuum of equilibria for n > 2. Suppose that firms
coordinate on the symmetric equilibrium that maximizes industry profits.20 The maximal
equilibrium markup is derived below.
Establishing equilibrium existence in n-firm oligopoly is rather involved, since there
might arise profitable non-local deviations by stealing consumers in distant sub-markets.
Although, for large n, conditions for maximal equilibrium existence carry over from the
duopoly case, stricter conditions are required in markets with a small number of firms.
The next lemma reports sufficient conditions, which are derived in detail in Appendix
C.4.
Lemma 6. A symmetric maximal equilibrium with n firms and prices, p∗(n) = m∗(n)+c =
((1 + λ)nt)/(λ − 1 + 2n) + c, exists
19For ∆p ≤ 0, firm i’s demand (resp. location of the indifferent loss-averse consumer) can be derived
considering the indirect utility functions for a price increase of firm i. For n = 2, firm i deviating from
symmetric prices (p, p) by a price increase to p′ is equivalent to firm −i deviating from symmetric prices
(p′, p′) by a price decrease to p. Therefore demand is symmetric around ∆p = 0 in this case and no kink
arises.
20Cf. literature on cheap–talk games. Note that there is also a continuum of equilibria under the alter-
native timing proposed by Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008). However, since consumers do not observe prices
under this alternative timing, firms do not only have to solve the coordination problem, but consumers must
be included as well in the coordination of beliefs, which equilibrium will be played.
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2 · ˆxˆ+1 (p∗(2) − p1|n) : n = 2 (solid), 100 (dashed)
p∗(2)
Loss-averse consumers covered by firm 1 (= twice location of the indifferent, loss-
averse consumer or n-times demand of firm 1) for varying n as a function of p1 for
parameter values of t = 1 and λ = 3: p∗(2) = 4/3
Figure 5: Location of the indifferent, loss-averse consumer (n = 2, 100)
1. for all λ ∈ (1, λc] with λc = 1 + 2√2 ≈ 3.828 if n = 2 or n > 6,
2. for all λ ∈ (1, λcc] with λcc = 1/4
(
1 +
√
57
)
≈ 2.137 if n ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}.
The maximal equilibrium markup can be derived from the first–order conditions of firm
i’s maximization problem using (15) and symmetry—i.e., ˆxˆi(0) = 1/n. The maximal
equilibrium markup equals
m∗(n) = (λ + 1)nt(λ − 1) + 2n , (17)
which is illustrated in Figure 6—the upper line shows the maximal equilibrium markup.
The grey line shows the minimal equilibrium markup m∗,−(n) = (λ+1)nt
λ(n−1)+n+1 , which is de-
creasing in n.
Our main result in this section is that the maximal equilibrium markup positively depends
on the number of firms in the consideration set, in contrast to the model with standard con-
sumers where it is independent of the number of firms. This holds because the reference
price distribution reacts less sensitive to a price change after an increase of the number
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Figure 6: Markups with loss aversion in both dimensions
of firms: in particular, in the duopoly model, consumers expect that they are likely to
be affected by a price deviation and thus adjust their reference–point distribution accord-
ingly, while, given a larger number of firms, the reference–point distribution reacts less
sensitive to a firm’s deviation from the maximal equilibrium strategy. Hence, since con-
sumers’ probability of buying the product of a particular firm—and thus their probability
of facing the price of that firm—is decreasing in n, loss aversion in the price dimension
becomes less pronounced as n increases. This is due to the fact that this probability is
a multiplicative term in the consumers’ gain–loss utility in the price dimension (e.g. see
Prob[p = p1] in (3)). Using the insights of Section 2.4 and focussing on the maximal
equilibrium, it follows that an increase in n has an anti–competitive effect.
We summarize our result as follows:
Proposition 5. In the Salop model with L = n and informed consumers, the number of
firms does not affect competition. By contrast, with uninformed loss-averse consumers
the maximal equilibrium price is increasing in the number of firms.
For n → ∞, the maximal equilibrium price p∗(∞) ≡ limn→∞ p∗(n) is the upper bound of
the equilibrium set that results in the model in which consumers do not observe price be-
fore forming their reference–point distribution. Thus, treating n as a continuous variable,
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as n turns to infinity, the correspondence of symmetric equilibria converges to the set of
symmetric equilibria under the alternative timing (which is invariant in n).
The comparison of markets with a different number of firms and an adjusted circumfer-
ence of the circle was introduced as an intermediate step.21 Let us compare the duopoly
market to a market with n > 2 firms (n-firm oligopoly). The latter captures a situation
in which all n firms belong to the consideration set of consumers because, at the ex–
ante stage, they do not know their location. We may think of each firm advertising the
existence and price of its product to all consumers—i.e., firms engage in non–targeted
advertising.
By contrast, if each firm can identify whether a consumers is located somewhere between
the firm’s location and the location of an adjacent firm, they may inform only consumers in
their vicinity about existence and price. We may call such a practice targeted advertising.
Effectively, the consideration set of consumer x ∈ [i, i + 1] is {i, i + 1} at the ex–ante
stage. The n-firm oligopoly model with such targeted advertising is outcome-equivalent
to the duopoly model in the paper. In particular, using symmetry, the re-scaled first-order
condition of profit maximization in the n-firm model with targeted advertising is the same
as the one of the duopoly model. Therefore, equilibrium prices are the same. This implies
that our comparative statics results with respect to the number of firms (going from n to 2
firms) can be interpreted as resulting from a switch in advertising technology from non-
targeted to targeted advertising in n-firm oligopoly. If firms coordinate on the equilibrium
that maximizes industry profits, they would be better off from jointly agreeing not to use
targeted advertising since this intensifies competition. However, since impressions on
distant consumers are wasted, we conjecture that firms would opt to target ads if they
were given the possibility, in order to avoid the associated costs.
We can extend our n–firm setup to one in which the mass of consumers is increasing in the
number of products n such that a firm’s profit with standard consumers will be constant
in n (for instance due to market integration). We receive that, under contextual consumer
loss aversion, firms’ profits are higher in larger markets than in smaller ones because
consumers are less price sensitive in the former markets. To the extent that firms offer
21The direct interpretation would be in the spirit of non–address models of imperfect competition of the
Dixit–Stiglitz–type, where an additional variant may not affect the pricing of firms.
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multiple products that do not directly cannibalize market share from each other, product
proliferation in our model can be seen as a means to make price comparisons less relevant.
5 Discussion
5.1 Empirical support and implications
Empirical support for consumer loss aversion. According to the marketing literature
on reference prices (for an overview see Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha (2005)), contextual
reference prices are important to explain consumer choices, in particular, as Rajendran
and Tellis (1994, p.33) point out, “when brand preference is weak, brand sampling is
wide, and shopping is infrequent.”22 While that literature typically proceeds by making
some ad hoc assumptions on the contextual reference point, our work can be seen as
providing a particular choice–based foundation how posted prices affect reference points.
In particular, we show that contextual reference prices are a market–share–weighted sum
of product prices (in equilibrium, market shares reflect purchase probabilities which are
inversely related to price levels). The fact that we consider loss aversion in the match–
value dimension in addition to loss aversion in the price dimension does not qualitatively
change our results concerning relative price levels (compare Section 2.4). Loss aversion
in the match–value dimension does, however, increase the overall price level.
Recent experimental work from the lab and the field provides evidence that economic
outcomes are well explained by expectation–based loss aversion. Such evidence comes
from exchange experiments (see Ericson and Fuster (forthcoming)) and lab experiments
in which participants are compensated for exerting effort in a boring task (see Abeler,
Falk, Goette, and Huffman (2011)). Similarly, there is evidence that expectation–based
reference dependence affects golf players’ performance (see Pope and Schweitzer (2011))
and cab drivers’ labor supply decision (see Crawford and Meng (2011)). Karle, Kirchsteiger, and Peitz
22Our model focuses on markets with infrequent purchases. By contrast, for environments with frequent
purchase decisions, e.g. Kalyanaram and Winer (1995) highlight the relevance of temporal reference prices
which depend on past prices. Temporal reference prices and occasional sales are not the focus of our paper.
See Zhou (2011) and Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2010) for formal investigations on this topic.
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(2011) find evidence for expectation–based reference dependence in a controlled con-
sumer choice setting with real consumption. In the lab, they isolate contextual reference
dependence and show that loss–averse consumers are more price–sensitive than standard
consumers when price difference is sufficiently large relative to taste difference.
Implications and predictions. Our comparative statics results with respect to the fraction
of ex–ante informed consumers lend themselves for empirical predictions, in particular
with respect to the equilibrium prices. We may relate the fraction of informed consumers
to the frequency with which consumers buy in a particular market or region. If purchases
are on average frequent this corresponds to a market or region with a large fraction of
informed consumers. Our baseline model then predicts that prices are lower in markets
or regions with more frequent purchases.
We focus our discussion on firm asymmetries and the size of the consumers’ consideration
set. We have shown that, for product categories in which brand preferences are weak and
shopping is infrequent (i.e., contextual reference pricing matters), price–cost margins are
low when producers are sufficiently asymmetric and/or the consumers’ consideration set
of products is small. This is due to the fact that, in those environments, loss aversion in
the price dimension, which has a pro–competitive effect, is less pronounced.
As markets evolve over time, initially, only few consumers of those active at that point in
time possess match–value information when forming their reference point. The fraction
of informed consumers supposedly increases over time as the market matures. We con-
sider a dynamic interpretation of our comparative statics results useful even though such
an interpretation may be criticized on the ground that our model ignores possibly relevant
dynamic effects of consumer and firm behavior. Comparative statics results about prices
translate into price paths in an evolving market (provided that the products’ lifetime is
exogenous). In particular, in markets for complex products of a particular generation, we
would expect that, as the market matures, more and more consumers become informed
about their valuation of product features well ahead of the inspection stage. Thus, a more
mature market refers to a market in which a larger fraction of consumers is ex–ante in-
formed about their match value (resp. to a market in which all consumers have initially
more precise information about their match value; see below). Our baseline model then
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predicts that prices are decreasing over time as opposed to models that highlight the im-
portance of low introductory prices with uninformed consumers as in Nelson (1970).
A particular application is the study of asymmetric duopoly markets for consumer goods.
In strongly asymmetric markets the price of the high-margin firm may be increasing over
time if more consumers become informed as the market matures. This is likely to be the
case if a national brand competes against a private label. Here, with a large fraction of
ex–ante uninformed consumers, relative price and market share of the low–cost private
label is larger than in the case in which consumers are fully informed ex ante. Setting low
prices therefore provides a means for the private label to be prominent in the market. By
contrast, our theory predicts that the price of the high–margin firm decreases over time in
moderately asymmetric markets. This is likely to be the case in a market in which two
national brands compete with each other.
Our theory provides a new perspective on information disclosure and advertising. Since
all consumers are fully informed at the purchasing stage, standard theory would predict
that it is irrelevant how far in advance of the purchasing stage information is revealed. Our
theory predicts that consumer behavior and market outcomes depend on whether and to
what extent match–value relevant information is revealed at an early stage. In particular,
our model predicts that advertising and other marketing instruments (as, e.g., the offer of
test drives or trial products) that allow for voluntary early information disclosure about
match value are more likely to be used in markets characterized by large asymmetries
between firms because one or both firms gain from information disclosure. Applied to
private labels, it may be profitable for private labels to disclose information on product
characteristics ex ante. A case in point may be Walmart’s announcement concerning food
labeling and its modified composition of nutrients and ingredients to make the private–
label products more healthy (see e.g. New York Times, January 20, 2011, “Wal–Mart
Shifts Strategy to Promote Healthy Foods” by Sheryl Gay Stolberg).
Targeting is becoming common for online retailers. For instance, Amazon recommends
particular products within a particular product category based on the inferred character-
istics of consumers. The literature has, in particular, looked at targeted advertising as
a means to increase profits, see e.g. Esteban, Gil, and Hernandez (2001). It has also
pointed out that targeted advertising can sometimes be used to fragment the market, see
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e.g. Iyer, Soberman, and Villas-Boas (2005). Our theory suggests a potential downside of
targeted advertising from the firms’ perspective: as the advertising technology allows for
better targeting, the consumers’ consideration sets become smaller, which makes firms
set prices more aggressively, and, in equilibrium, this leads to lower prices. Thus, as the
technological possibilities of targeting, e.g. of search portals, are improved, prices may
decrease.
Our symmetric n–firm extension also suggests that loss aversion in the price dimension
plays a less important role if the number of firms increases. This is due to the fact that
the probability of buying from a certain firm decreases in n. Focussing on the maximal
equilibrium, this implies that, in symmetric markets, firms compete less if the number
of products increases. Thus, as pointed out above, product proliferation can be seen
as a means to make price comparisons less relevant. Allowing for asymmetries across
firms we conjecture that an increase in n reduces low–cost firms’ incentives to gain extra
market share or prominence by setting low prices. Thus, price competition should be
more pronounced in asymmetric markets in which consumers make few comparisons.
5.2 Robustness
Consumers with noisy signals. In the previous sections, we have considered consumers
which are either fully informed or fully uninformed and have allowed for variations of the
fraction of the two consumer groups. We can modify our setup, however, to a situation
in which consumer information becomes a continuous variable. We do so by introduc-
ing noisy signals about consumers’ match value which are fully revealing with a certain
probability (precision) and pure noise with the complementary probability. Under full
precision, consumers are ex–ante informed, while they are ex–ante uninformed if the pre-
cision of the signal is zero. In Appendix E, we show that, in symmetric settings, our
results with a mixed population of fully informed and fully uninformed consumers trans-
late to a single group of continuously informed consumers. In particular, increasing the
fraction of informed consumers is qualitatively similar to increasing the precision of the
noisy signals consumers receive. In asymmetric duopoly, our comparative statics results
in β may not find a counterpart in the modified model in which consumers receive noisy
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signals because demand is not monotone in the signal precision.
Further issues. In line with most of theory on imperfect competition, but in contrast to
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008), we considered markets in which information on the firms’
costs is public (at least among firms). This has allowed us to compare our results to those
in the standard Hotelling–Salop model of imperfect competition. Suppose now that each
firm privately observes its marginal cost. Under the timing that consumers form reference
points before observing prices, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) have shown that firms may
decide not to condition their prices on their private information. By contrast, under our
assumptions on the timing of events, namely that consumers initially observe prices and
form their reference point distribution when already knowing the prices of the products,
one can show that, in any interior equilibrium of the duopoly model, firms will always
condition their price on their private information—i.e., the equilibrium is non–focal. This
is seen as follows: For any prices set by the competitors, firm i has a unique best response.
This best response is strictly increasing in ci. Hence, there cannot exist an equilibrium in
which each firm ignores its private information. The equilibrium price of firm i as a
function of this firm’s marginal cost must be strictly increasing.
Another feature of our setting is that consumers obtain information about the two products
simultaneously. What happens if the information about products has to be acquired se-
quentially by uninformed, loss–averse consumers? We can show that our main qualitative
insights are confirmed in a duopoly setting in which uninformed consumers have to incur
a positive shopping cost to visit the second product. In such a sequential search extension
consumers first investigate the offering of the more efficient firm, as price information is
always available.
6 Conclusion
This paper aims at a better understanding of the competitive effects of expectation–based
consumer loss aversion. For this purpose we embed consumers with expectation–based
loss aversion into a Hotelling–Salop model, which is a standard workhorse in the mod-
ern industrial–organization literature (see, e.g., Tirole (1988) or Belleflamme and Peitz
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(2010)). We distinguish between ex–ante informed consumers who behave identically to
consumers with standard preferences and ex–ante uninformed consumers for whom loss
aversion affects behavior. In the baseline model, a larger fraction of ex–ante informed
consumers increases competition and thus leads to lower prices. Two forces are at play:
Loss aversion in the match–value dimension has an anti–competitive effect, whereas loss
aversion in the price dimension has a pro–competitive effect. The latter tends to dominate
the former with strongly asymmetric efficiency levels. An increase in the share of ex–ante
informed consumers is anti–competitive, in contrast to our findings in the baseline model.
Furthermore, increasing the size of the consumers’ consideration set is anti–competitive
when selecting the payoff–dominant equilibrium.
Our model makes a novel conceptual point when embedding Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)’s
framework of rational expectation–based loss aversion into a standard imperfect com-
petition model: When price information is immediately accessed by consumers, while
information about match values is not—this is most likely the case for complex or less
frequently bought products—firms can use price to manage the reference–point distri-
bution of consumers in the match–value and the price dimensions and, thus, affect their
preferences at the purchase stage.23 We have shown in this paper that this possibility ad-
mits price variation in equilibrium. This is in contrast to Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008)
who predict that firms in equilibrium “insure” loss–averse consumers against price fluc-
tuations by setting identical focal prices across products or sticky prices over time. Their
finding is due the fact that loss–averse agents dislike (initially unobservable) variation
in monetary outcomes.24 In our setup, however, all uncertainty about match values and
purchase prices at the reference–point–formation stage stems only from product charac-
teristics. In other words, only match–value uncertainty generates consumer loss aversion
in our setup.
23Also, firms’ information–disclosure policy about product characteristics can be seen as an expectation
management tool. Such information disclosure can be achieved through advertising campaigns and pro-
motional activities, which do not generate additional information at the moment of purchase (at this point,
consumers would be informed in any case), but inform consumers before they form their reference point
distribution.
24This reasoning has been applied to a contracting problem by Herweg, Mueller, and Weinschenk (2010)
to show the optimality of binary wage schemes in employment relationships with moral hazard and non–
binary states.
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A feature of our setting is that there are no dynamics in the formation of reference points.
One may wonder whether the results are robust if price information becomes available
only at an intermediate stage—i.e., consumers initially have price expectation, which may
have to be corrected at an intermediate stage. Consumer utility then also includes a term
that depends on the deviation of observed prices from equilibrium price expectations, as
in Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008). We conjecture that the qualitative features of our com-
parative statics results hold true for an appropriate equilibrium selection and a sufficiently
small weight (i.e., a sufficiently large discount factor) on gains and losses at the interme-
diate stage. More generally, one could extend our model to allow for informative signals
over time, as in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). We leave this issue for future research.
Another feature of our setting is that, if a firm releases information on the match value
of its product, consumers fully infer the match value of the other product, as well. Fu-
ture work may want to look at alternative settings in which information is not perfectly
correlated across products, giving rise to a richer set of information-disclosure policies.
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Appendix
A Relegated Proofs
A.1 Relegated proof of Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the properties of the reference–point distributions, we rewrite
the utility function as
u1(x, p1, p2) =(v − tx − p1) + (1 − ˆxˆ)(p2 − p1)
− λ · t
( ∫ 1− ˆxˆ
0
2(x − s) ds +
∫ x
1− ˆxˆ
(x − s) ds
)
+ t
( ∫ ˆxˆ
x
(s − x) ds
)
=(v − tx − p1) + (1 − ˆxˆ)(p2 − p1)
− λ · t
2
(
x2 + 2x(1 − ˆxˆ) − (1 − ˆxˆ)2
)
+
t
2
( ˆxˆ − x)2 (18)
u2(x, p1, p2) =(v − t(1 − x) − p2) − λ · ˆxˆ(p2 − p1) − λ · t
∫ 1−x
0
2((1 − x) − s) ds
+ t
( ∫ 1− ˆxˆ
1−x
2(s − (1 − x)) ds +
∫ ˆxˆ
1− ˆxˆ
(s − (1 − x)) ds
)
=(v − t(1 − x) − p2) − λ · ˆxˆ(p2 − p1) − λ · t(1 − x)2
+ t
(
(x − ˆxˆ)2 + (1
2
− x − ˆxˆ + 2x ˆxˆ)
)
. (19)
To determine the location of the indifferent uninformed consumer x = ˆxˆ, we set u1 = u2,
where
u1( ˆxˆ, p1, p2) = (v − t ˆxˆ − p1) + (1 − ˆxˆ)(p2 − p1) − λ · t2
(
1 − 2(1 − ˆxˆ)2
)
(20)
u2( ˆxˆ, p1, p2) = (v − t(1 − ˆxˆ) − p2) − λ · ˆxˆ(p2 − p1) −
(
λ · t(1 − ˆxˆ)2 − 2t(1
2
− ˆxˆ)2
)
(21)
If she buys product 1, the indifferent uninformed consumer will experience no gain but the
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maximum loss in the match–value dimension. If she buys product 2, she will experience a
gain and a loss because distance could have been smaller or larger than 1− ˆxˆ. With respect
to the price dimension the indifferent uninformed consumer (like all other consumers)
faces only a loss when paying price p2 and only a gain when paying price p1.
u1( ˆxˆ, p1, p2) = u2( ˆxˆ, p1, p2) can be transformed to the following quadratic equation in ˆxˆ,
0 = 2t(λ − 1) · ˆxˆ2 +
(
(λ − 1)(p2 − p1) − 4tλ
)
· ˆxˆ +
(
2(p2 − p1) + t2(3λ + 1)
)
. (22)
Solving this quadratic equation in ˆxˆ leads to the expression given in the lemma. If λ ∈
(1, λc], the second solution to the quadratic equation can be ruled out as it violates the
restriction that it is contained in [0, 1] for any feasible price difference ∆p ∈ [0,∆p¯]. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The first derivative of xˆ(∆p) with respect to ∆p is equal to 1/(2t) for
all ∆p ≤ t. Evaluated at ∆p = 0, demand of ex–ante uninformed consumers reacts less
price sensitive than demand of ex–ante informed consumers. This can be seen as follows:
The derivative of ˆxˆ(∆p) with respect to ∆p for ∆p ∈ [0,∆p˜],
ˆxˆ′(∆p) = − 1
4t
− 1
2 · S (∆p) ·
(
∆p
8t2
− (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
,
is strictly positive. Evaluated at ∆p = 0, we obtain
ˆxˆ′(0) = − 1
4t
+
(λ + 2)
2t(λ + 1) .
For λ → 1, ˆxˆ′(0) is approaching 1/(2t) from below.
Moreover, ˆxˆ(∆p) is strictly convex for all ∆p ∈ [0,∆p˜], as illustrated in Figure 1.
ˆxˆ′′(∆p) = (3 + λ)(5 + 3λ)64t2 · (S (∆p))3 > 0
We note that the degree of convexity of ˆxˆ(∆p) is strictly increasing in λ.
Evaluated at large price differences, the property concerning the price sensitivity, is re-
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versed due to convexity of ˆxˆ:25
ˆxˆ′(∆p˜) = λ(7λ + 22) + 19
4t|λ(λ − 6) − 11| −
1
4t
>
1
2t
f or λ ∈ (1, λc].
Thus, ˆxˆ′(∆p˜) > xˆ′(∆p˜).26 Interior demand of uninformed consumers, evaluated at large
price differences, reacts more sensitive to an increase in the price difference than the
demand of informed consumers.
Since xˆ′(∆p) is constant and ˆxˆ′(∆p) continuous and monotone (with the required boundary
properties), applying the mean value theorem, there exists a unique intermediate price
difference ∆pˆ ∈ [0,∆p˜] such that ˆxˆ′(∆pˆ) = xˆ′(∆pˆ) = 1/(2t). This critical price difference
can be explicitly calculated as
∆pˆ =
t
(
2
√
2 · (2(λ + 2)) − 3 ·
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
√
2(λ − 1)
,
which is strictly positive for all λ > 1 since numerator and denominator of ∆pˆ(λ) are
strictly positive in this range. 
A.2 Relegated proof of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 4.
d(∆p∗)
d(∆c) = −
(φ′)2
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) · (−1) (23)
=
(φ′)2
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ)
Denote the denominator of d(∆p∗(∆c))/d(∆c) by D(∆p∗; β). We show that, on the relevant
domain of price differences, D(∆p∗; β) is strictly positive. We have that
D(0; β) = 3(φ′(0; β))2 + φ′′(0; β) · 0
25Note that ∆p˜ = (λ + 3)t/(2(λ + 1)) < t for λ > 1.
26For λ → λc, ˆxˆ′(∆p˜) → ∞.
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= 3(φ′(0; β))2 > 0
The sign of the derivative is of ambiguous sign:
∂D(∆p; β)
∂∆p
= 6φ′φ′′ + φ′′′(1 − 2φ) − 2φ′′φ′
= 4φ′φ′′ + φ′′′(1 − 2φ)
Thus D(∆p∗; β) is not necessarily non-negative. However, since D(∆p∗; β) is equivalent
to the tangent condition (36) which approaches zero at ∆p = ∆pta(λ, t) we conclude that
d(∆p∗)
d(∆c) > 0 (24)
for ∆p < ∆pta(λ, t), which is the relevant domain for equilibrium existence. Moreover,
since φ′′(1 − 2φ) = 0 for ∆c = 0 (i.e., ∆p = 0) and φ′′(1 − 2φ) ≤ 0 for ∆c > 0, it holds
true that d(∆p∗(∆c))/d(∆c) ≥ 1/3. 
B Tables
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
u
n
d
e
r
C
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
L
o
s
sA
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
45
Table 2: Small Cost Differences:
The table shows the analytical solution of the market equilibria for parameter values of t = 1, λ = 3, c1 = 0.25, c2 = 0.5:
β p∗1(β) p∗2(β) ∆p∗(β) q1(∆p∗) xˆ(∆p∗) ˆxˆ(∆p∗) π∗1 π∗2 CS ∗ CS ∗in CS ∗un
1.0 1.33333 1.41667 0.0833333 0.541667 0.541667 0.532453 0.586806 0.420139 1.37674 1.37674 1.16648
0.8 1.37274 1.45643 0.0836887 0.539995 0.541844 0.532597 0.606272 0.439961 1.29508 1.33717 1.12672
0.6 1.41524 1.49932 0.0840806 0.538326 0.54204 0.532755 0.627281 0.461361 1.21022 1.29448 1.08382
0.4 1.46121 1.54572 0.0845149 0.536662 0.542257 0.532931 0.650008 0.484522 1.12178 1.24832 1.03742
0.2 1.51103 1.59603 0.0849986 0.535002 0.542499 0.533127 0.674653 0.509652 1.02934 1.19828 0.987112
0.0 1.56518 1.65072 0.0855405 0.533347 0.54277 0.533347 0.701446 0.536986 0.932421 1.14388 0.932421
Table 3: Intermediate Cost Differences
The table shows the analytical solution of the market equilibria for parameter values of t = 1, λ = 3, c1 = 0.25, c2 = 1:
Prices of both firms are first increasing and then decreasing in β.
β p∗1(β) p∗2(β) ∆p∗(β) q1(∆p∗) xˆ(∆p∗) ˆxˆ(∆p∗) π∗1 π∗2 CS ∗ CS ∗in CS ∗un
1.0 1.5 1.75 0.25 0.625 0.625 0.605992 0.78125 0.28125 1.14063 1.14063 0.834921
0.8 1.5039 1.758 0.254109 0.62324 0.627054 0.60798 0.781477 0.285586 1.07357 1.13519 0.827071
0.6 1.50553 1.76414 0.25861 0.621651 0.629305 0.61017 0.780502 0.289112 1.00758 1.13188 0.821115
0.4 1.50448 1.76803 0.263546 0.62026 0.631773 0.612585 0.778104 0.29165 0.942908 1.13111 0.81744
0.2 1.50029 1.76925 0.26896 0.619097 0.63448 0.615251 0.774048 0.293008 0.879835 1.13332 0.816464
0.0 1.49248 1.76737 0.274896 0.618194 0.637448 0.618194 0.768092 0.292988 0.818625 1.13897 0.818625
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Table 4: Large Cost Differences:
The table shows the analytical solution of the market equilibria for parameter values of t = 1, λ = 3, c1 = 0.25, c2 = 1.25:
Non-existence for β = 0 (see Figure 8).
β p∗1(β) p∗2(β) ∆p∗(β) q1(∆p∗) xˆ(∆p∗) ˆxˆ(∆p∗) π∗1 π∗2 CS ∗ CS ∗in CS ∗un
1.0 1.58333 1.91667 0.333333 0.666667 0.666667 0.648371 0.888889 0.222222 1.02778 1.02778 0.673468
0.8 1.5623 1.90417 0.341863 0.66734 0.670931 0.652973 0.875753 0.217615 0.974147 1.04598 0.686806
0.6 1.5361 1.88738 0.351282 0.668631 0.675641 0.658117 0.859926 0.211208 0.923306 1.06911 0.7046
0.4 1.5043 1.86596 0.361666 0.670654 0.680833 0.663868 0.841199 0.202865 0.87537 1.09757 0.727236
0.2 1.46663 1.83971 0.373075 0.673535 0.686538 0.670284 0.819444 0.192519 0.830299 1.13163 0.754968
0.0 - - - - - - - - - - -
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C Appendix: Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness
C.1 Symmetric Duopoly
Here, we investigate equilibrium existence. Equilibrium uniqueness in symmetric duopoly
follows from Lemma 7 below. For any interior solution, quasi-concavity of the profit func-
tions would assure that the solution to the first-order conditions characterizes an equilib-
rium. However, profit functions are not quasi-concave. If firm i sets a much lower price
than firm j, firm i’s profit becomes increasingly convex due to the increasing convexity of
its demand with loss-averse consumers.
∂2πi
∂p2i
= −2q′i + (pi − c)q′′i , (25)
where q′′i = ∂2qi(∆p)/∂∆p2 which is positive for ∆p > 0 but negative for ∆p ≤ 0 due
to symmetry (since qi(−|∆p|) = 1 − qi(|∆p|)). Using that (pi − c) = qi/q′i by FOCi, the
second-order condition of firm i can be expressed as
−2(q′i)2 + qiq′′i < 0. (26)
For β < 1, equation (33) is satisfied for ∆p sufficiently small, while it is violated for
∆p → ∆p¯, as q′′i goes faster to infinity in ∆p than (q′i)2.
The next proposition clarifies the issue of equilibrium existence. It deals with the non-
quasi-concavity of firm i’s profit function by determining critical levels for the degree of
loss aversion such that no firm i has an incentive to non-locally undercut prices. We use
that the convexity of firm i’s profit function is increasing in ∆p which yields that stealing
the entire demand of loss-averse consumers is the only possibly optimal deviation of firm
i. We focus on the most critical case for equilibrium existence, the case in which all
consumers are loss-averse.27
27Adding more standard consumers always reduces the problem of non-quasi-concavity of firm i’s profit
function since the demand of standard consumers is linear. Thus, the upper bound on the degree of loss aver-
sion with only loss-averse consumers is sufficient for existence with a positive share of standard consumers.
Cf. an older working paper version of this paper (SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper, 319).
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Proposition 6. Suppose that all consumers are loss averse (β = 0) and there are two firms
in the market. A symmetric equilibrium with prices p∗i for all i ∈ {1, 2} exists if and only if
1 < λ ≤ λc with λc = 1 + 2
√
2 ≈ 3.828. (27)
Proof of Proposition 6. In this proof we rule out non-local deviations from symmetric
price equilibrium in the duopoly case—i.e., when firms only compete in their neighboring
sub-markets. Let firm i be the deviating firm. It has been shown that firm i’s profit is
concave if the price difference ∆p is sufficiently small—i.e., ∆p is negative or not too
positive. Therefore, non-local price increases are never profitable. Since the degree of
“convexity” of firm i’s profit increases in ∆p, firm i’s most profitable price deviation is a
price reduction stealing the entire demand of loss-averse consumers.28
We next derive the critical upper bound of the degree of loss aversion for which stealing
the entire demand of loss-averse consumers is not profitable. To steal the entire market,
firm i sets a deviation price pdi = p∗ − ∆p˜. For β = 0, the firm i’s deviation profit, πdi , can
be expressed as follows,
πdi = (pdi − c) · 1 = (p∗ − c) − ∆p˜. (28)
Firm i’s profit in symmetric equilibrium is equal to
π∗i = (p∗i − c) · qi(0) =
(p∗ − c)
2
. (29)
Thus, a deviation from symmetric equilibrium is not profitable if and only if
π∗i (λ) ≥ πdi (λ)
⇔ ∆p˜(λ) ≥ p
∗(λ) − c
2
by (28) and (29)
⇔ (λ + 3)t
2(λ + 1) ≥
t
2 − (λ−1)(λ+1)
by (4) and (7)
28 The intuition behind this result is that for sufficiently large price differences loss-averse consumers try
to avoid buying the more expensive product. Furthermore, this avoidance is the more attractive the higher
the degree of loss aversion. This holds true because the degree of convexity of firm i’s demand increases in
the degree of loss aversion—i.e., ∂q′′i /∂λ > 0.
Competition under Consumer Loss Aversion 49
⇔ (λ + 3)2 ≥ 2(λ + 1)2
Since λ > 1, we receive the unique solution λ ≤ λc ≡ 1 + 2
√
2. 
C.2 A More Flexible Symmetric Duopoly Model
Proposition 7 (Existence in duopoly with different degrees of loss aversion). Suppose that
there are two firms in the market and all consumers are loss averse (β = 0) with different
degrees of the two dimensions of loss aversion (λp, λm > 1). A symmetric equilibrium with
prices
p∗i = c +
2(λm + 1)t
λp + 3
, i = 1, 2,
exists if and only if λm > 1 and λp ∈ (1, λcp(λm)] with
λcp(λm) =
λm + 7
λm − 1
. (30)
Proof of Proposition 7. Analogously to the proof of Proposition 6, a deviation from the
symmetric candidate equilibrium is not profitable if and only if
π∗i (λp, λm) ≥ πdi (λp, λm)
⇔ ∆p˜(λp, λm) ≥
p∗i (λp, λm) − c
2
by (28) and (29)
⇔ (λm + 3)t
2(λp + 1) ≥
t
2 − 2(λm+1)t
λp+3
⇔ λp ≤
λm + 7
λm − 1
≡ λcp(λm).

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C.3 Asymmetric Duopoly
C.3.1 Equilibrium Uniqueness in Asymmetric Duopoly
In Lemma 7 we provide sufficient conditions under which an interior equilibrium is
unique. Given parameters λ and t, the condition states that the cost asymmetry between
firms is not too large.29
Lemma 7. An equilibrium is the unique interior equilibrium if
∆c < ∆cu(λ) ≡ ∆p¯ = 2t(λ − 1)
(
2(λ + 2) −
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
. (31)
Proof of Lemma 7. We have to derive a number of useful properties of f (∆p; β) = (1 −
2φ)/φ′: First, f (0; β) = 0/φ′(0) = 0∀β. Second, at λ = λc: lim∆p↑∆ p˜ f (∆p; β) = 0 since
lim∆p↑∆ p˜ φ′(∆p; β) = ∞∀β < 1 as S (∆p˜) = 0, and f (∆p˜; 1) = −2∆p˜ < 0. Third,
f ′(∆p; β) = −2(φ
′)2 − φ′′(1 − 2φ)
(φ′)2 = −
(
2 + φ
′′(1 − 2φ)
(φ′)2
)
≶ 0 ∀β < 1,
since f ′(0; β) = −2 < 0 ∀β and f ′(∆p˜; β) > 0 ∀β < 1. Moreover, f ′(∆p; 1) =
−2 ∀∆p.
It has to be shown that f (∆p; β) is strictly convex in ∆p ∈ [0,∆p˜] for β < 1. We find that
f ′′(∆p; β) = −(φ
′φ′′′ − 2(φ′′)2)(1 − 2φ) − 2(φ′)2
(φ′)3 > 0.
We first consider the case of λ = λc ≈ 7.47, for which ∆p˜ = ∆p¯. Figure 7 illustrates the
equilibrium condition (14) at ∆c = ∆p¯. Now, if β < 1 by continuity of f (∆p) for ∆p ∈
[0;∆p¯], f (0; β) = 0, lim∆p↑∆ p¯ f (∆p; β) → 0, f ′(0; β) < 0, lim∆p↑∆ p¯ f ′(∆p; β) = ∞ > 1, and
strict convexity of f (∆p) for β < 1, we know that, for ∆c ≥ ∆p¯, there are two candidate
interior equilibria since the ( f (∆p) +∆c)-curve shifts up and intersects the ∆p-line twice.
For values of ∆c lower than ∆p¯, ( f (∆p¯; β < 1) + ∆c) is always smaller than ∆p¯ and no
other equilibrium can exist.
29Since t turns out to simply scale equilibrium markups, m∗i = p∗i − ci, we set t = 1 here.
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∆p
f (∆p; β) + ∆c : solid, ∆p : dashed
Equilibrium condition (14) at ∆c = ∆p¯ for parameter values of β = 0, t = 1, and
λ = λc: ∆p˜ = ∆p¯ = 0.6180.
Figure 7: Two potential interior equilibria
If β = 1, f (∆p; β) is strictly decreasing for all ∆p and at most one intersection between
f (∆p; 1) + ∆c and ∆p exists (standard Hotelling case).30
Secondly, in the case of 1 < λ < λc all uninformed consumers buy from firm 1 at ∆p =
∆p˜, which is smaller than ∆p¯. Since f is continuous, f (∆p˜; β) < 0, and f (∆p; β) =
(1 − 2(βxˆ(∆p) + (1 − β))) · 2t/β is strictly decreasing for ∆p > ∆p˜, ∆c < ∆p¯ is sufficient
to rule out other equilibria in this case. 
In the lemma ∆p¯ depicts the upper bound of ∆p such that S (∆p) in ˆxˆ(∆p) is equal to
zero (Cf. equation (6)). For λ = λc, ∆p˜ = ∆p¯. It is easy to check that ∆cu(λ) is strictly
decreasing in λ.
We also can provide conditions that non-interior equilibria do not exist. For the sake of
brevity, here we restrict attention to the case β = 0.
Lemma 8. Suppose that all consumers are uninformed (β = 0) and the degree of loss
30In this case an analytical solution for (14) can be determined: ∆p∗ = ∆c/3.
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aversion, λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2]. Non-interior equilibria do not exist if
∆c ≤ ∆cni(λ) ≡ 2∆p˜ = (λ + 3)t
λ + 1
. (32)
Proof of Lemma 8. The candidate non-interior equilibrium is p∗∗1 = c2 − ∆p˜, p∗∗2 = c2.
The associated profits are π∗∗1 = (c2 − ∆p˜ − c1) · 1 = ∆c − ∆p˜ and π∗∗2 = 0. Note that for
∆p∗∗ = ∆p˜ setting p2 = c2 is the local best response of firm 2.
We consider a non-local deviation by firm 1 to p1 = c2. The associated profit is (c2 −
c1)φ(0) at p1 = c2. Hence, a sufficient condition for the non-existence of non-interior
equilibria is
∆c − ∆p˜ ≤ (c2 − c1)φ(0) = ∆c2 .
This is equivalent to
∆c ≤ 2∆p˜.
For λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2 · √2], ∆p˜ is equal to ∆p˜(λ) = (λ + 3)t/(2(λ + 1)), which completes the
proof. 
Combining Lemmata 7 and 8 we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 8. For ∆c < min{∆cu,∆cni}, any equilibrium is unique and interior.
C.3.2 Equilibrium Existence in Asymmetric Duopoly
For any interior solution, concavity of the profit functions would assure that the solution
characterizes an equilibrium.
∂2π1
∂p21
= −2φ′ + (p1 − c1)φ′′ < 0 (S OC1)
∂2π2
∂p22
= −2φ′ − (p2 − c2)φ′′ < 0. (S OC2)
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Given the properties of φ (in particular, that φ is strictly increasing and convex in ∆p
for β < 1) S OC2 holds globally, whereas S OC1 is not necessarily satisfied. Using that
(p1 − c1) = φ/φ′ by FOC1, S OC1 can be expressed as
−2(φ′)2 + φφ′′ < 0. (33)
It can be shown that (33) is satisfied for small ∆p, while it is violated for ∆p → ∆p˜
and λ → λc, as φ′′ goes faster to infinity in ∆p than (φ′)2.31 This violation of S OC1
reflects that firm 1 may have an incentive to non-locally undercut prices to gain the entire
demand of uninformed consumers when ∆p is large. The driving force behind this is that
loss aversion in the price dimension increasingly dominates loss aversion in the match–
value dimension if price differences become large. Moreover, excessive losses in the
price dimension if buying the expensive product 2 make also nearby consumers of 2 more
willing to opt for product 1.
The next proposition clarifies the issue of equilibrium existence. It deals with the non-
quasiconcavity of firm 1’s profit function by determining critical levels of market asym-
metries and the degree of loss aversion such that firm 1 has no incentive to non-locally
undercut prices. Here, we make use of the increasing convexity of firm 1’s profit func-
tion in −p1 which yields that stealing the entire demand of uninformed consumers is the
unique optimal deviation of firm 1. For notational convenience, we focus on the most
demanding setting for equilibrium existence. This is the one in which all consumers are
uninformed.32
Proposition 9. Suppose that all consumers are uninformed (β = 0) and the degree of
loss aversion, λ, lies within the interval (1, 1 + 2√2]. An interior equilibrium with prices
(p∗1, p∗2) exists if and only if
∆c ≤ ∆cnd(λ) ≡ ∆pnd(λ) − f (∆pnd(λ); 0), (34)
31This implies that π1 is not globally concave. It is easy to check that it is neither globally quasi-concave.
This is illustrated in Figure 8 in Appendix C. Moreover, the non-concavity of π1 is increasing in ∆p (resp.
−p1) for ∆p ≤ ∆p˜ (resp. p1 ≥ p2 − ∆p˜).
32Adding more informed consumers always makes the non-quasiconcavity problem less severe as the
demand of informed consumers is linear. Thus, the derived upper bound on cost asymmetries with only
uninformed consumers is sufficient for existence with a positive share of informed consumers.
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with ∆pnd(λ) being implicitly defined as the solution ∆pnd(λ) , ∆p˜ of the equation
∆p = ∆p˜ − φ(∆p; β) · (1 − φ(∆p; β))
φ′(∆p; β) . (35)
Before presenting its proof, let us comment on this proposition. The result shows that an
equilibrium exists if firm 1 has no incentive to non-locally undercut prices. In fact, the
incentive to undercut prices increases in more asymmetric industries or for more loss–
averse consumers. For a low degree of loss aversion (1 < λ < 1 + 2√2 ≈ 3.828), an
equilibrium exists if the cost difference between firms is not too large (see (34)).33 In this
case, an equilibrium exists for all values of β. However, if the degree of loss aversion rises
further, equilibria only exist if there is a sufficiently large share of informed consumers
which reduces the undercutting incentive of firm 1. This tradeoff is illustrated in Table 5
below.
Table 5: Non-deviation condition
Variation of ∆pnd and ∆cnd in β and λ. (t = 1)
λ = 3 λ = 6
β ∆pnd(λ, β) ∆cnd(λ, β) ∆pnd(λ, β) ∆cnd(λ, β)
0.8 0.648337 1.75869 0.372669 1.07069
0.6 0.543254 1.45317 0.23824 0.686206
0.4 0.459237 1.22329 0.107415 0.314749
0.2 0.377489 1.00993 - -
0.0 0.278889 0.75963 - -
In the proof of Proposition 9 we first provide the critical level of ∆c for which the equi-
librium condition in (14) is satisfied for candidate interior equilibria. We next identify the
set of candidate interior equilibria which are robust to local and non-local price deviations
of firm 1.
Proof of Proposition 9. 1. To find an upper bound on ∆c for which the equilibrium
33For instance, experimental work by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) suggests that λ takes the value 2.25,
which is within this range.
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condition (14) is satisfied, we determine the point at which f (∆p; β) is a tangent on
the ∆p-line. In Figure 7 this corresponds to an upward shift of the f (∆p; β)-curve.
The tangent condition is
f ′(∆p; β) = 1 ⇔ 3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) = 0 (36)
It is sufficient to consider β = 0 as the most problematic case with respect to ex-
istence. The reason is that for β > 0 there is a positive weight on the demand of
informed consumers which is linear. Denote the critical price difference that satis-
fies (36) at β = 0 as ∆pta(λ). We note that it is decreasing in λ.
Then, the equilibrium condition in (14) is fulfilled if and only if ∆c satisfies the
following condition
∆c ≤ ∆cta(λ) ≡ ∆pta(λ) − f (∆pta(λ); 0). (37)
∆cta(λ) is uniquely determined by∆pta(λ), using equilibrium condition (14) because
at the tangent point there is a one-to-one relationship between the two variables.34
2. At this step, we show that a solution to the first-order condition is a local maximizer.
Suppose, by contrast, that, at ∆p = ∆p′, S OC1 is not satisfied. Then, at ∆p′, firm
1’s profit takes a minimum and ∆p′ cannot be an equilibrium. Now, define ∆ps(λ)
as the critical price difference which satisfies the second-order condition of firm 1
(33) with equality. There is a unique ∆ps(λ) for any given λ because the convexity
of π1 is strictly decreasing in p1. Thus, S OC1 holds for ∆p ≤ ∆ps(λ). We next show
that S OC1 implies the tangent condition—i.e., ∆ps(λ) < ∆pta(λ). Rearranging (33)
and (36) leads to
φ
2
≤ (φ
′)2
φ′′
, (33’)
(2φ − 1)
3 ≤
(φ′)2
φ′′
. (36’)
34For ∆cu(λ) ≤ ∆c < ∆cta(λ) there might arise two candidate interior equilibria. However as we see next,
the second one does not survive the local S OC1 criterion.
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Profit of firm 1, π1(p1, p∗2), as a function of its own price p1 given p2 = p∗2 for ∆c = 1
(c1 = 0, c2 = 1) and parameter values of β = 0, t = 1, and λ = 3: p∗1 = 1.17309,
pd1 = p
∗
2 − ∆p˜ = 0.80863, p∗2 = 1.55863, ∆p∗ = 0.385537, and ∆p˜ = 3/4.
Figure 8: Non-existence
Hence, ∆ps(λ) < ∆pta(λ) holds if and only if φ/2 > (2φ − 1)/3. This inequality is
satisfied for all φ ∈ [1/2, 1].
3. Due to the increasing convexity of π1 in −p1 a candidate interior equilibria which
locally satisfy S OC1 might be ruled out as an equilibrium because a non-local devi-
ation may be profitable. This is the case when the convexity is sufficiently large: A
non-local price decrease becomes a profitable deviation for firm 1—an example of
this kind is presented in Figure 8. Given the increasing convexity of π1, the unique
optimal deviation of firm 1 (if it exists) is characterized by firm 1 serving the entire
market of uninformed consumers—i.e., pd1 such that ∆pd = ∆p˜. Decreasing pd1 fur-
ther is not profitable since firm 1 does not attract more consumers, while its profit
margin goes down for all consumers. Hence, in the following we will restrict our
attention to price deviations by firm 1 that steal the entire demand of uninformed
consumers. If deviating is profitable, firm 1 sets pd1 = p∗2 − ∆p˜. For β = 0, firm 1’s
deviation profit πd1 is equal to (pd1−c1)·1 since φ(∆p˜; 0) = 1. Using that pd1 = p∗2−∆p˜
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we receive
πd1 =
(
p∗2 − ∆p˜ − c1
)
· 1
=
(1 − φ
φ′
+ ∆c − ∆p˜
)
· 1 by FOC2
=
(
∆p∗ +
φ
φ′
− ∆p˜
)
· 1 by (14) (38)
For the candidate interior equilibrium, firm 1’s profit is equal to π1(∆p∗) = (p∗1 −
c1)φ, which in turn is equal to φ2/φ′ by FOC1.
Thus, a deviation of firm 1 is not profitable if and only if π1(∆p∗) ≥ πd1. Rearranging
yields
∆p∗ ≤ ∆p˜ − φ · (1 − φ)
φ′
. (39)
This is the required non-deviation condition. We define ∆pnd(λ) as the non-trivial
solution different from ∆p˜ to (39) holding with equality. We have
∆pnd(λ) = ∆p˜ −
φ(∆pnd(λ); 0) ·
(
1 − φ(∆pnd(λ); 0)
)
φ′(∆pnd(λ); 0) .
Lemma 9 below shows that ∆pnd(λ) is uniquely determined by this non-deviation
condition if the trivial solution, ∆p˜, is excluded. Furthermore, the set of non-
negative ∆pnd(λ) is non-empty for λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2].
Again by using the equilibrium condition (14), an interior equilibria exists if and
only if ∆c ≤ ∆cnd(λ) ≡ ∆pnd(λ) − f (∆pnd(λ)).35
4. Taken together, due to increasing convexity of π1, the non-deviation condition im-
plies local concavity of the firms’ profit function and therefore, as shown above,
the tangent condition. Thus any price difference resulting from a candidate interior
35Since ∆cnd is a function of β, while ∆cu is not, we have to be more careful to have a uniqueness
statement for β > 0. Fix some β > 0. For ∆cu(λ) ≤ ∆c < ∆cnd(λ) (where, in an abuse of notation, the
latter critical value is adjusted for β), the equilibrium condition (14) may not make a unique selection—i.e.,
there might arise a second solution to (14), ∆p∗∗. This solution can be ruled out, however, because, by
construction, ∆p∗∗ is larger than ∆pta(λ) and, hence, larger than ∆pnd(λ).
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equilibrium which satisfies the non-deviation condition can be supported in equi-
librium, as ∆pnd(λ) < ∆ps(λ) < ∆pta(λ) < ∆p˜(λ). This provides a bound on the
admissible cost asymmetry that is given in the proposition.

Lemma 9. For β = 0 and λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2], ∆pnd(λ) is the unique non-trivial solution
(i.e., ∆pnd(λ) , ∆p˜) to equation (35). Moreover, ∆pnd(λ) is non-negative.
Proof of Lemma 9. Note that the non-deviation condition is trivially satisfied at ∆p = ∆p˜
since φ(∆p˜; β) = 1 for β = 0 (see Figure 9 below for a graphical illustration of the non-
deviation condition). It can be shown that A(∆p) ≡ ∆p + φ(1 − φ)/φ′ approaches ∆p˜
from above for ∆p < ∆p˜. For ∆p ≥ 0 but ∆p being small, A(∆p) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave. Moreover, A(∆p) is continuous and exhibits at most one maximum
for ∆p ∈ [0,∆p˜). Taken together, there exists a unique ∆p ∈ [0,∆p˜) at which the non-
deviation condition is satisfied if and only if, at ∆p = 0, A(∆p) is smaller or equal than
∆p˜. For β = 0, A(0) = (λ+ 3)/(4t(λ+ 1)) and ∆p˜ = (λ+ 3)t/(2(λ+ 1)). It is easy to check
that A(0) ≤ ∆p˜ if and only if λ ∈ (1, 1+ 2√2]. Denoting the solution to the non-deviation
condition by ∆pnd(λ) completes the proof.36 
If the degree of loss aversion becomes sufficiently high (λ > 1 + 2√2 ≈ 3.828), the set
of non-negative ∆pnd(λ) becomes empty. Here, deviating is profitable even in symmetric
industries (∆c = 0). However, restricting the share of uninformed consumers can establish
existence of symmetric equilibria also in this case.
For illustration, we provide a numerical example on equilibrium existence and unique-
ness. For λ = 3, t = 1 and β = 0, the following price differences arise: ∆pnd(3) =
0.27889, ∆pu(3) = 0.31072, ∆ps(3) = 0.48259, ∆pta(3) = 0.69532, ∆p˜ = 0.75, and
∆p¯ = 0.83485. Moreover, ∆cnd(3) is equal to (∆pnd(3) − f (∆pnd(3); 0)) = 0.75963—i.e.,
an equilibrium exists for ∆c < 0.75963. The other critical values are ∆cu(3) = 0.83485,
∆cta(3) = 1.40396, and ∆cni(3) = 1.5. Since ∆cnd(3) < ∆cu(3), the equilibrium is the
unique interior equilibrium. Since ∆cnd(3) < ∆cni(3), there does not exist a non-interior
36We receive ∆pnd(1 + 2√2) = 0 and, for λ → 1, ∆pnd(λ) → ∆p˜.
Competition under Consumer Loss Aversion 59
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
∆p
∆p + φ·(1−φ)
φ′ : solid, ∆p˜ : dashed
∆pnd(λ) ∆p˜
Non-deviation condition of firm 1, as a function of the price difference ∆p for ∆c =
0.25 (c1 = 0.25, c2 = 0.5) and parameter values of β = 0, t = 1, and λ = 3: ∆pnd(3) =
0.27889, ∆cnd(3) = (∆pnd(3) − f (∆pnd(3); 0)) = 0.75963, and ∆p˜ = 3/4. Non-
deviation for ∆p ≤ ∆pnd(3) = 0.27889.
Figure 9: Non-deviation in asymmetric industries
equilibrium. For equilibrium values at ∆c = 0.25 and 0.75, see Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix
B. An example for non-existence at β = 0 is provided in Figure 8 with ∆c = 1.
C.4 Symmetric n-Firm Oligopoly
In n-firm oligopoly there might arise profitable non-local deviations by stealing consumers
in distant sub-markets. We next establish existence of symmetric maximal equilibria in
this setup.37 Although conditions for existence carry over from the duopoly case for
n sufficiently large, there might arise additional existence problems in markets with a
small number of firms when consumers are loss averse up to the level that constitutes
the upper bound of the duopoly case (λc ≈ 3.828). As mentioned before, in contrast to
37Note that symmetric maximal equilibria are the symmetric equilibria, for which deviations by a price
decrease are most profitable. Moreover, deviations from symmetric equilibrium candidates by a price in-
crease are never optimal due to demand concavity in this price range. Thus, maximal equilibrium candidates
are the most critical for symmetric equilibrium existence.
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Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008), in our setup consumers observe prices ex ante and adjust
their reference–point distributions to price deviations.
We restrict the analysis to the most demanding case: All consumers are loss-averse (β =
0). Divide the circle of length L = n into 2n sub-markets of length 1/2. Thus, there are
n sub-markets on each half of a circle and 2 between each pair of neighboring firms. In a
symmetric maximal equilibrium, a firm located at yi serves all consumers on the left and
the right neighboring sub-market—i.e., all consumers x within [yi − 1/2; yi + 1/2].38
Due to symmetry, it suffices to consider deviations on one half of the circle only and to
locate the deviating firm at y1 = 0. This firm (=firm 1) is supposed to deviate from the
symmetric maximal equilibrium by lowering its price. If it attracts consumers up to the
mth sub-market (on the first half of the circle), firm 1’s (right) indifferent consumer is
located at ˆxˆ+1 ∈ [ (m−1)2 , m2 ] with 2 ≤ m ≤ n. Its total demand equals 2 ˆxˆ+1 /n due to the
uniform distribution of x. Loss-averse consumers who expect ˆxˆ+1 to be located in the mth
sub-market for given prices, form the following reference–point distribution with respect
to the match-value dimension,
• for even m:
Gm(s|n) =

2
n
(n − (m − 2))s, s ∈ [0, 1 − ( ˆxˆ+1 − m−22 )];
2
n
(n − (m − 1))s + a( ˆxˆ+1 ,m, n), s ∈ (1 − ( ˆxˆ+1 − m−22 ), 12];
2
n
s + b( ˆxˆ+1 ,m, n), s ∈ (12 , ˆxˆ+1 ].
with a( ˆxˆ+1 ,m, n) = (m−1)/n−2 ˆxˆ+1 /n and b( ˆxˆ+1 ,m, n) = 1−2 ˆxˆ+1 /n being the required
constants for the kinked cdf.
• for odd m:
Gm(s|n) =

2
n
(n − (m − 1))s, s ∈ [0, ˆxˆ+1 − m−12 ];
2
n
(n − (m − 2))s + a˜( ˆxˆ+1 ,m, n), s ∈ ( ˆxˆ+1 − m−12 , 12];
2
n
s + ˜b( ˆxˆ+1 ,m, n), s ∈ (12 , ˆxˆ+1 ].
38Since the set of consumers is restricted to mass one and x is uniformly distributed on [0; n], the demand
of firm i on [yi − 1/2; yi + 1/2] is equal to 1/n.
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It can be easily seen that both distributions coincide for ˆxˆ+1 reaching the boundaries be-
tween two neighboring sub-markets: e.g., for ˆxˆ+1 = 1 G2(s|n) = G3(s|n) and for ˆxˆ+1 = 3/2
G3(s|n) = G4(s|n) and so on. For n = m = 2, we are back in the duopoly case.
To see how the reference–point distributions can be derived, consider the case of m = 3
and n ≥ 3: ˆxˆ+1 ∈ [1; 3/2] means that the deviating firm 1 steals all consumers up to the
location of its right neighbor (firm 2 located at y2 = 1) and some even in the neighbor’s
backyard market. Therefore, an equilibrium taste difference s within [0; ˆxˆ+1 −1] ⊆ [0; 1/2]
can be expected by consumers on each of the n sub-markets on the first half of the circle,
except for the two sub-markets neighboring firm 2 (m = 2, 3). This holds true since
consumers who turn out to be located in these two sub-markets, will be attracted by the
deviating firm 1 which is located further apart, while consumers on all other sub-markets
will buy from the firm closest by. The resulting probability of facing a taste difference in
this interval equals (2/n)(n − 2)s. An equilibrium taste difference s ∈ ( ˆxˆ+1 − 1; 1/2] can
be expected on n − 1 sub-markets (on the first half of the circle) since also consumers
on sub-market m = 3 with x ∈ ( ˆxˆ+1 ; 3/2] will be buying from their closest firm, which is
firm 2 located at y( ˆxˆ+1 )2 = 1. Thus, G3(s|n) is equal to 2/n(n − 1)s plus a constant in this
interval. Facing an equilibrium taste difference s ∈ (1/2; ˆxˆ+1 − 1] = (1/2; 1] ∪ (1; ˆxˆ+1 − 1],
there is each time one particular sub-market consumers expect to be located in: m = 2 for
s ∈ (1/2; 1] and m = 3 for s ∈ (1; ˆxˆ+1 − 1]. Hence, the probability of s ∈ (1/2; ˆxˆ+1 − 1] is
equal to 2/n · s plus a constant.
From the functional form of Gm(s|n) it follows directly that, for given n, a distribution with
a higher m first-order stochastically dominates the ones with lower m. This is because
consumers expect to be attracted by the deviating firm with a higher probability when it
steals a large market share. Therefore, buying from the closest firm becomes less likely:
Consumers put less weight on taste differences less than 1/2 and positive weight on taste
differences greater than 1/2.39 An increase in the number of firms has exactly the opposite
effect to an increase in the number of stolen sub-markets by the deviating firm: For a
given m, the reference–point distribution puts more mass on small taste differences if the
39For this updating behavior the observability of prices is crucial. In contrast to this, consumers in
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) cannot adjust their reference point to price deviations because prices become
observable only after forming their reference point.
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number of firms n increases. Here, the chance of being affected by a price cut of a single
firm simply washes out if the total number of firms increases without bound.
The probability of buying from the deviating firm 1 (=probability of facing purchase
price p1) is ˆxˆ+1 in the duopoly and generalizes to 2 ˆxˆ+1 /n in the n-firm case. The intuition
for this mirrors the one just given above: If the number of firms rises, consumers are less
likely to be affected by a price cut of a single firm. Using the generalized reference–
point distribution in both dimensions, we can derive a generalized demand function for
symmetric markets with n firms. Consider, for instance, the indirect utility functions of
a consumer x who has learned to be located in sub-market m (with m even) which is
the sub-market consumers ex ante expected the indifferent loss-averse consumer to be
located in,40 given prices (p1 < p∗). Moreover, suppose this consumer is the indifferent
loss-averse consumer on this side of the circle, x = ˆxˆ+1 ∈ [(m − 1)/2; m/2]. Then, her
indirect utility if buying from the deviating firm 1 can be expressed as follows,41
u1( ˆxˆ+1 , p1, p∗, ..., p∗) =v − t ˆxˆ+1 − p1 +
1 − 2 ˆxˆ+1
n
 (p∗ − p1)
− λt
( ∫ 1−( ˆxˆ+1 − (m−2)2 )
0
( ˆxˆ+1 − s)
2
n
(n − (m − 2))ds
+
∫ 1/2
1−( ˆxˆ+1 − (m−2)2 )
( ˆxˆ+1 − s)
2
n
(n − (m − 1))ds +
∫ ˆxˆ+1
1/2
( ˆxˆ+1 − s)
2
n
ds
)
=v − t ˆxˆ+1 − p1 +
1 − 2 ˆxˆ+1
n
 − λt4n (−8( ˆxˆ+1 )2 + 4(m + n) ˆxˆ+1 − ((m − 1)m + n)) .
It can be seen that the indifferent loss-averse consumer faces only a gain in the price
dimension (last term in the first line) when purchasing the product of the deviating firm.
In the match–value dimension she faces the maximum loss (second and third line). If
buying from firm i + m/2 instead, her indirect utility equals
u1+m/2( ˆxˆ+1 , p1, p∗, ..., p∗) =v − t(1 − ( ˆxˆ+1 −
(m − 2)
2
)) − p∗ − λ
2 ˆxˆ+1
n
 (p∗ − p1)
40We use this latter condition here, since, as we show later, the mapping from ∆p = p∗ − p1 ∈ R+0 into
m ∈ [2, 3, ..., n− 1, n] is not a function but a correspondence—i.e., for given price difference ∆p, there may
exist several personal equilibria ˆxˆ+1 within different sub-markets.
41Compare the indirect utility function for m = 2 in the proof of Lemma 11 and consult Section 2 for a
detailed exposition of the utility function with reference dependence.
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− λt
∫ 1−( ˆxˆ+1− (m−2)2 )
0
(1 − ( ˆxˆ+1 −
(m − 2)
2
) − s)2
n
(n − (m − 2))ds
+ t
( ∫ 1/2
1−( ˆxˆ+1−
(m−2)
2 )
(s − (1 − ( ˆxˆ+1 −
(m − 2)
2
)))2
n
(n − (m − 1))ds
+
∫ ˆxˆ+1
1/2
(s − (1 − ( ˆxˆ+1 −
(m − 2)
2
)))2
n
ds
)
=v − t(1 − ( ˆxˆ+1 −
(m − 2)
2
)) − p∗ − λ
2 ˆxˆ+1
n
 (p∗ − p1)
+
t
4n
(
4(2 − (λ − 1)n¯)( ˆxˆ+1 )2 + 4(((λ − 1)n¯ − 1)m + n) ˆxˆ+1
+ ((1 − (λ − 1)n¯)m − 2n − 1)m + n
)
,
with n¯ ≡ ((n − m) + 2). Here, the indifferent loss-averse consumer only faces a loss
in the price dimension but losses and gains in the taste dimension—cf. the proof of
Lemma 11 where m = 2. By setting u1 = u1+m/2, we can solve the consumers’ personal
equilibrium and determine ˆxˆ+1 for given n and given that ex ante consumers expect ˆxˆ+1 ∈
[(m − 1)/2; m/2] for given prices.42 Firm 1’s demand from loss-averse consumers in even
sub-market m, q1(∆p|m, n, β = 0), is then characterized by 2 ˆxˆ+1/n. Firm 1’s demand for
odd sub-markets m can be derived analogously.
To analyze whether deviations to sub-markets m, m ≥ 3, are profitable, we first consider
consumers located on the boundaries of the sub-markets, ˆxˆ+1 = 1, 3/2, ..., (n − 1)/2, n/2.
For ˆxˆ+1 being an integer, firm 1 attracts consumers up to the location of a competing firm,
while for ˆxˆ+1 = j + 1/2, j ∈ N, it also attracts the entire backyard market of competitor
j. As is known from the standard Salop oligopoly, the price differences for ˆxˆ+1 = j and
ˆxˆ+1 = j + 1/2 coincide. This means that firm 1’s demand has a discontinuous jump of
size 1/2 · 2/n = 1/n at this price difference. It can be shown, however, that despite this
420 = u1 − u1+m/2 is equivalent to
0 =
(
(n − m) + 4
)
(λ − 1)t · ( ˆxˆ+1 )2 −
(
(((λ − 1)m + λ + 3)n − (λ − 1)(m − 3)m) t − 2(λ − 1)∆p
)
· ˆxˆ+1
+
1
4
(
8n∆p + nt
(
(λ − 1)m2 + λ + 4m − 1
)
− (λ − 1)m((m − 3)m + 1)t
)
.
We do not present the functional form of ˆxˆ+1 (∆p|m, n) here for two reasons. First of all, it is lengthy and
tedious to derive, as ui − ui+m/2 = 0 describes a quadratic equation in ˆxˆ+1 . Secondly, since we are mainly
interested in deviations to the boundaries of a sub-market m, we can fix ˆxˆ+1 at (m − 1/2) or m/2 and solve
for the corresponding price difference ∆p.
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feature non-local deviation are never profitable in the standard Salop model. To check this
in a world with loss-averse consumers, we next derive the deviation price differences for
ˆxˆ+1 = 1, 3/2, ..., (n− 1)/2, n/2. For a deviation covering an even number of sub-markets m
(resp. an odd number of sub-markets m′ = m − 1), replace ˆxˆ+1 in u1 − u1+m/2 = 0 by m/2
(resp. (m − 1)/2) and solve for ∆p.
∆peven(m, n) =
(
2(λ + 1)m − (λ − 1)
)
n + (λ − 1)(m − 1)m
4(λ − 1)m + 8n t, m even and n ≥ m ≥ 2,
∆podd(m′, n) =
(
2(λ + 1)n − (λ − 1)(m′ − 1)
)
(m′ − 1)
4(λ − 1)m′ + 8n t, m
′ odd and n ≥ m′ ≥ 3.
It can be shown that both deviation price differences are increasing in m and n. The first
implication of this is very intuitive: For a given number of firms n, attracting consumers
on more sub-markets m requires a larger price difference—i.e., a larger price cut by the
deviating firm. Secondly and more interestingly, if the number of firms n increases, a
larger price cut is necessary to steal a given number of sub-markets m. The intuition for
this is that, for a larger number of firms, consumers expect to be less often affected by a
certain price cut of a single firm and, therefore, expect their equilibrium taste difference
to be low. This increases the loss in the taste dimension for those consumers who ex post
happen to buy from the more distant deviating firm, and this makes it more difficult for
the deviating firm to steal a large share of the market. Consider for example two markets
with n = 3 and 5, (λ = 3, t = 1): ∆peven(2, 3) = 19/20 < ∆peven(2, 5) = 33/28 <
∆peven(4, 5) = 7/4. Similarly, ∆podd(3, 3) = 5/6 < ∆podd(3, 5) = 9/8 < ∆podd(5, 5) = 8/5.
It can also be seen here that the price difference necessary to steal the entire backyard
sub-market of a competitor is lower than the one necessary to steal consumers up to the
location of this competitor—i.e., ∆podd(m + 1, n) < ∆peven(m, n). This demonstrates a
violation of the law of demand which is caused by the fact that consumer’s indirect utility
functions if buying the cheap or the most-liked product are decreasing in consumer’s
location x on odd sub-markets. Hence, to describe a personal equilibrium, ˆxˆ+1 must be
decreasing in ∆p on odd sub-markets. This makes deviations under which the deviating
firm steals an odd number of sub-markets particularly profitable, as will be shown in
the next paragraph. In the example, the demand of the deviating firm is given by m/2 ·
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2/n = m/n and the corresponding markup in symmetric maximal equilibrium equals
m∗(3) = 3/2 and m∗(5) = 5/3. This illustrates that the deviation price difference might
become larger than the maximal equilibrium markup if the number of firms n and the
number of deviations m become sufficiently large: In the example we find m∗(5) = 5/3 <
∆peven(4, 5) = 7/4. Therefore, those kind of deviations generate losses for the deviating
firm and are, therefore, never optimal.
We next evaluate whether there exist profitable deviations from the symmetric maximal
equilibrium with n > 2 firms and λ ≤ λc = 1 + 2
√
2 ≈ 3.828 (compare Prop. 6). The
maximal equilibrium profit, π∗(n), can be expressed by
π∗(n) = m∗(n) · 1
n
=
(1 + λ)t
(λ − 1 + 2n) ,
with the maximal equilibrium markup, m∗(n), being derived in Section 4 (cf. equation
(17)). The deviation profits for even and odd deviations are equal to
πeven(m, n) =
(
m∗(n) − ∆peven(m, n)
)
· m
n
πodd(m′, n) =
(
m∗(n) − ∆podd(m′, n)
)
· m
′
n
.
Deviation profits change monotonously in n and m: πodd(m, n) and πeven(m, n) are monotonously
decreasing in n and m. This is shown in Table 6, where we restrict attention to λ = λc,
the highest level of loss aversion at which a symmetric maximal equilibrium exists for
n = 2. For smaller levels of loss aversion with λ > 1 deviating is less profitable, but the
monotonicity in n and m is preserved. The table illustrates that deviating becomes less
profitable if the number of firms n in the market increases43 and that within the class of
odd (resp. even) deviations stealing a small number of sub-markets m is preferable to
stealing a larger number of sub-markets. Moreover, it is depicted that for a given number
of firms n stealing an odd number of sub-markets m′ = m + 1 is more profitable than
stealing an even number of sub-markets m. Thus, the deviation profit is highest in a three-
firm oligopoly when the deviating firm steals the entire market (m = 3). Note that m = 1
can be excluded since ∆podd(1, n) coincides with ∆p∗(n) = 0, the symmetric maximal
43This also implies that non-local deviations in the home market (m = 2), as considered in the duopoly
case, are less profitable if n raises.
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Table 6: Deviation profits with n firms
The table shows the variation of πodd(m, n)/t and πeven(m, n)/t in n and
m for λ = λc = 1 + 2
√
2 (and β = 0).
n m 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 0.7071
3 0.4676 0.8360
4 0.3400 0.5877 0.3694
5 0.2624 0.4373 0.1444 0.3506
6 0.2111 0.3388 0.0096 0.1418 -0.1676
7 0.1751 0.2705 -0.0750 0.0060 -0.3607 -0.2384
8 0.1486 0.2211 -0.1296 -0.0851 -0.4861 -0.4151 -0.7769
Table 7: Extra profit from deviating
The table shows the variation of (πodd(m, n)− π∗(n))/t and (πeven(m, n)−
π∗(n))/t in n and m for λ = λc = 1 + 2√2 (and β = 0).
n m 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 0
3 -0.0793 0.2891
4 -0.1059 0.1418 -0.0765
5 -0.1139 0.0610 -0.2320 -0.0258
6 -0.1145 0.0131 -0.3160 -0.1839 -0.4932
7 -0.1118 -0.0165 -0.3619 -0.2809 -0.6476 -0.5253
8 -0.1078 -0.0354 -0.3860 -0.3415 -0.7426 -0.6715 -1.033
equilibrium.
To identify the deviations that are the most critical for existence, the difference between
deviation and maximal equilibrium profit are presented in Table 7. By construction,
πeven(2, 2) = π∗(2) at λ = λc (cf. Prop. 6). It can be seen that there exist profitable
deviations from symmetric maximal equilibrium for λ = λc. However, only deviations
stealing m = 3 sub-markets are profitable if the number of firms is not too large—i.e.,
n ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}. More generally, this can be shown by solving for the critical number of
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firms nodd(m, λ) in πodd(m, n) − π∗(n) = 0 with nodd(m, λ) being the only positive solution.
nodd(m, λ) = (λ − 1)(λ + m)m +
√(
mλ2 + 2(3(m − 2)m + 4)λ + (m − 2)(m + 6)m + 8)m
4(λ + 1)(m − 2)
Deviating is profitable for given λ, m, and n if n < nodd(m, λ) and m ≤ n. Moreover,
nodd(m, λ) is strictly decreasing in m for nodd(m, λ) > m and strictly increasing in λ. There-
fore, m = 3 is the most critical deviation and profitable for n < nodd(3, λc) ≈ 6.3890. A
critical n can be derived for even deviations analogously. We skip this step here since
even deviations are dominated by odd ones. To rule out deviations from symmetric max-
imal equilibrium for all n ≥ 2, the maximum degree of loss aversion λ has to be below
λc = 1 + 2
√
2 ≈ 3.828.
Before stating the conditions for symmetric maximal equilibrium to exist, we return to
the issue of multiple personal equilibria for given prices. Since ∆podd(3, n) < ∆peven(2, n),
consumers facing a price difference ∆p = ∆podd(3, n) between the deviating firm and non-
deviating firms could expect ˆxˆ+1 to be located either on the second or the third sub-market
(on the first half of the circle). Expecting m = 3 rather than m = 2 given ∆p = ∆podd(3, n)
is preferable for the deviating firm because it receives a strictly larger market share, but it
is not necessarily preferable for consumers. For instance, consumers who do not buy the
lower-priced product will ex post experience a higher loss in the price dimension since the
probability of low purchase price increases in ˆxˆ+1 .44 Therefore, the deviations considered
above use the most conservative personal equilibrium and deliver the strictest conditions
for a maximal equilibrium to exist.
Lemma 10. A symmetric maximal equilibrium with n firms and prices, p∗(n) = m∗(n)+c =
((1 + λ)nt)/(λ − 1 + 2n) + c, exists if n ≥ nodd(3, λ) with λ > 1.
The derivation of nodd(m, λ) and the relevance of nodd(3, λ) is provided in the text. We
finally provide a proof of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 6. nodd(3, λc) ≈ 6.3890. Thus, n = 2 or n > 6 suffice for existence at
λ = λc. Maximal equilibrium existence holds for 1 < λ < λc since nodd(3, λ) is increasing
44Cf. the concept of (consumer’s) preferred personal equilibrium of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007).
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in λ. Existence for n ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6} follows from the same property: nodd(3, λ) = 3 for
λ = λcc = 1/4
(
1 +
√
57
)
≈ 2.137. 
Hence, existence in the duopoly case carries over to the n-firm oligopoly case for suffi-
ciently large n. For symmetric markets with a small number of firms, however, maximal
equilibrium might fail to exist for intermediate values of λ (λ < λc).
D Appendix: Demand in n-Firm Oligopoly
In this appendix we first specify utility functions for any vector of prices. We then derive
demand for price vectors such that one firm deviates from symmetric prices. To obtain
the two–dimensional reference–point distribution of loss–averse consumers, suppose that
the price vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) is such that any sub-market between two neighboring
firms is served by only these two firms—i.e., the maximum price difference between any
two neighboring firms is not too large in absolute terms.45 The rank order of the price
difference, ∆p+i = pi+1 − pi, and distance between firm i and her indifferent loss-averse
consumer on the right, ˆxˆ+i − yi = ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1) ∈ [0, 1], are identical.46 This holds true
since the reference comparison induced by reference-dependent utility is, by construction,
rank-order maintaining. For example, if pi = pi+1 (∆pi = 0), then ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1) = 1/2 (by
symmetry), while ˆxˆ+j − ( j − 1) > 1/2 if p j < p j+1 (∆p j > 0). The reference–point
distribution in the price dimension, F(p), is the probability that the equilibrium purchase
price p∗ is not larger than p. Recall that due to consumers’ initial taste uncertainty, the
equilibrium purchase price is not known when consumers form their reference point, even
though firms’ prices are already disclosed. Under the uniform distribution of x, we obtain
F(p) =
∑
i∈{i|pi≤p}
( ˆxˆ+i − ˆxˆ−i )
n
. (40)
45The case in which a single firm serves several sub-markets is considered in Section C in the Appendix.
46Note that the index i for ∆p+i is modulo n—i.e., ∆p+n = p1 − pn.
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We next define the distances z j between an indifferent consumer’s location and the loca-
tions of her two neighboring firms,47
∀ j ∈ {1, ..., 2n} : z j =

ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1), if j = 2i − 1;
1 − ( ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1)), if j = 2i.
(41)
Distances z j can be ordered by rank. Let z[k] describe the kth smallest distance in {z j}2nj=1
and #(z[k]) the number of distances of size z[k].48 σ(x) describes consumer x’s pur-
chase decision (pure-strategy personal equilibrium), which requires that, for given prices
p, consumers correctly anticipate the locations of the indifferent consumers { ˆxˆ+i }ni=1. The
reference–point distribution in the taste dimension, G(s), is the probability that the equi-
librium taste difference between the consumer’s ideal taste x and the taste of the purchased
product yσ(x) is smaller than s—i.e., G(s) = Prob(|x − yσ(x)| ≤ s). We obtain,
G(s) =

2s, s ∈ [0, z[1]];
2s 2n−#(z[1])2n + a1, s ∈ (z[1], z[2]];
...
...
2s 2n−
∑k
j=1 #(z[ j])
2n + ak, s ∈ (z[k], z[k + 1]];
...
...
2s 2n−
∑K−1
j=1 #(z[ j])
2n + aK−1, s ∈ (z[K − 1], z[K]];
aK = 1, s ∈ (z[K], 1].
(42)
with {ak}Kk=1 being the required constants for the (K−1)-times kinked, piecewise linear cdf.
If all prices are the same, then consumers expect to buy from their closest firm ex post with
probability one. The distribution of the expected taste difference, G(s), is not kinked in
this case and approaches the uniform distribution: K = 1 and G(s) = 2s for s ∈ (0, 1/2].
If there are two or more different prices pi in the market, then there are at least two
different distances z j. For small realized taste differences, s ∈ [0, z[1]], consumers expect
47Note that max{z2i−1, z2i} represents the maximum taste difference consumers located between firm i and
i + 1 are willing to accept for given prices. Also note that max j∈{1,...,2n}{z j} reflects consumers’ maximum
acceptable taste difference in the entire market and corresponds to the largest price difference between two
neighboring firms.
48Obviously, if there are no ties between price differences and between distances, then #(z[k]) = 1 for all
k ∈ {1, ..., K} and K = 2n.
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to buy from their closest firm ex post and, thus, G(s) = 2s. For a larger taste difference,
however, consumers anticipate that they will be attracted with positive probability to the
more distant, cheaper firm ex post. For this to happen, given s ∈ (z[1], z[2]], the realization
of x must be sufficiently close to the more expensive firm in the sub-market with the
largest price difference. Let, for instance, ∆p+i = pi+1 − pi be the (unique) maximum price
difference for given p. Then, the indifferent consumer, ˆxˆ+i , in this sub-market is more
closely located to the high-price firm i + 1 (yi+1 = i). Moreover, the distance between
firm i + 1 and the indifferent consumer ˆxˆ+i is the smallest distance in the entire market—
i.e., yi+1 − ˆxˆ+i = i − ˆxˆ+i = 1 − ( ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1)) = z[1]. Thus, if the realization of x lies
in the interval [yi+1 − z[2], ˆxˆ+i ], the consumer will be attracted by the low-price firm i.
Therefore, the consumer will not buy from her closest firm in equilibrium. This means
that for s ∈ (z[1], z[2]], only 2n − 1 sub-markets are relevant for the probability of facing
s and G(s), therefore, equals 2s(2n − 1)/2n plus a constant. This argument carries over
to all s ∈ (z[k], z[k + 1]] with 1 ≤ k ≤ K ≤ 2n. G(s) shows up to 2n − 1 kinks if there n
distinct price differences in the market.
Consider the indirect utility functions of a consumer who has learned, after forming her
reference–point distribution given prices, that her ideal taste x lies in the sub-market be-
tween firm i and firm i+1. Suppose further that this consumer is the indifferent loss-averse
consumer on this sub-market—i.e., x = ˆxˆ+i ∈ [i − 1, i]. The consumer faces a distance of
ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1) = z2i−1 to firm i and 1 − z2i−1 to firm i + 1. Her indirect utility if buying from
firm i can be expressed as
ui(x = ˆxˆ+i , p) =v − tz2i−1 − pi
+
(
− λ
∑
j∈{ j|p j≤pi}
( ˆxˆ+j − ˆxˆ−j )
n
(pi − p j) +
∑
j∈{ j|p j>pi}
( ˆxˆ+j − ˆxˆ−j )
n
(p j − pi))
)
+
(
− λt
∫ z2i−1
0
(z2i−1 − s)dG(s) + t
∫ 1
z2i−1
(s − z2i−1)dG(s)
)
,
where the first line describes the consumer’s intrinsic utility from product i. As in the
duopoly model, v represents the common reservation value for one unit of any product,
and t scales the disutility from distance between ideal and actual taste on the circle. The
first term in the second line shows the loss in the price dimension from not facing a lower
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price than pi, while the second term in this line shows the gain from not facing a higher
price than pi. The two terms in the third line correspond to the loss (gain) from not facing
a smaller (larger) distance in the taste dimension than ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1) = z2i−1. If buying from
firm i + 1 instead, the indifferent consumer’s indirect utility is
ui+1(x = ˆxˆ+i , p) = v − t(1 − z2i−1) − pi+1
+
(
− λ
∑
j∈{k|pk≤pi+1}
( ˆxˆ+j − ˆxˆ−j )
n
(pi+1 − p j) +
∑
j∈{k|pk>pi+1}
( ˆxˆ+j − ˆxˆ−j )
n
(p j − pi+1)
)
+
(
− λt
∫ (1−z2i−1)
0
((1 − z2i−1) − s)dG(s) + t
∫ 1
(1−z2i−1)
(s − (1 − z2i−1))dG(s)
)
.
By setting ui−ui+1 = 0 for all i and solving for { ˆxˆ+i }ni=1, we determine the locations of indif-
ferent loss-averse consumers (consumers’ personal equilibria) for any given p (provided
that a solution exists).
Since the focus of this paper is on symmetric firms and symmetric price equilibria, we
can restrict our attention to prices that are the same for all firms but one. The variation in
the price of one firm is required to determine the symmetric equilibrium prices in stage
1 of the game. Let pi , p′ be the price set by firm i and p j = p′, j , i, the price of
other firms in the market. By symmetry, the location of indifferent consumers in any sub-
market with zero price difference lies exactly in the middle between the two firms on this
sub-market—i.e., ˆxˆ+j − ( j − 1) = 1/2. The location of indifferent consumers in the two
sub-markets around firm i is further apart from firm i than 1/2, if firm i has set a lower
price than any neighboring firm—i.e., ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1) = (i − 1) − ˆxˆ−i > 1/2 for pi < p′—and
vice versa if firm i has set a higher price than any neighboring firm. In the following
lemma, we solve for the location of the indifferent consumer ˆxˆ+i as a function of the price
difference ∆p = p′ − pi ≥ 0, conditional on the number of firms n in the market. In an
abuse of notation, let ˆxˆ+i depend on the size of the price deviation ∆p and the price p′ that
is set by all other firms, i.e. p = (p′, ...., p′, pi, p′, ...p′).
Lemma 11. Suppose that ˆxˆ+i ∈ [(i − 1) + 1/2, i], pi ≤ p′, and p j = p′ for all j , i.
Moreover, λ > 1. Then ˆxˆ+i , as a function of the price difference ∆p ≡ p′ − pi ∈ [0,∆p¯]
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given the price vector p = (p′, ..., p′, pi, p′, ..., p′), is
ˆxˆ+i (∆p, p′) = (i − 1) +
( 4
(λ − 1)(n + 2) +
3n + 2
n(n + 2)
)
− 2∆p
n(n + 2)t − 2S (∆p), (43)
where
S (∆p) =
√
(λ − 1)2 · ∆p2 − (λ − 1)Λt · ∆p + (1 + λ)2n2t2
((λ − 1)n(n + 2)t)2
with Λ = (2(λ − 1) + n(3λ + 2n + 5)) and ∆p¯ being the upper bound of ∆p for which the
square root S (∆p) is defined.49
From the general form of ˆxˆ+i (∆p, p′) in Lemma 11, we can derive the demand of loss-
averse consumers for a price decrease of firm i, ˆxˆi(∆p, p′): Using the uniform distribution
of x and symmetry we obtain
ˆxˆi(∆p, p′) =
ˆxˆ+i (∆p, p′) − ˆxˆ−i (∆p, p′)
n
=
2
n
(
ˆxˆ+i (∆p, p′) − (i − 1)
)
=
2
n
z2i−1. (44)
In the proof of Lemma 11, we make use of the fact that there exist only two indifferent
consumers whose locations are different from 1/2, the indifferent consumers to the right
and the left of firm i. Since their locations are symmetric, it suffices to solve a system of
one (quadratic) equation and one unknown—i.e., to solve ui − ui+1 = 0 for ˆxˆ+i . For λ → 1,
ui − ui+1 = 0 collapses to a linear equation and ˆxˆ+i (∆p, p′) shows a much simpler form.
Proof of Lemma 11. We rewrite the indirect utility functions for the indifferent consumer
to the right of firm i and solve for her location (personal equilibrium).
Since the price differences in the sub-market between firm i − 1 and firm i and in the
one between firm i and firm i + 1 are the same—i.e., the taste differences which the two
49For x ∈ [i − 1, i], consumer x’s personal equilibrium (determining her product choice—i.e., σ(x,∆p) ∈
arg max j∈{i,i+1} u j(x, p j, p− j)) is described by
σ(x,∆p) =
i if x ∈ [yi, ˆxˆ
+
i (∆p, p′)],
i + 1 if x ∈ ( ˆxˆ+i (∆p, p′), yi+1].
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indifferent consumers of firm i face are the same—we have ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1) = (i − 1) − ˆxˆ−i .
We, therefore, can simplify ˆxˆ+i − ˆxˆ−i in F(p) to 2( ˆxˆ+i − (i − 1)) or, equivalently, to 2z2 j−1.
Furthermore, using that p j = p′ for all j , i, we obtain that
F(p) =

2z2 j−1
n
if p ∈ [pi, p′)
1 if p ≥ p′.
A price deviation pi < p′ implies that ˆxˆ+i − (i−1) = z2 j−1 > 1/2. Thus, the smallest critical
taste distance in the market exists between ˆxˆ+i and firm i + 1 (and between ˆxˆ−i and firm
i − 1). This distance is equal to 1 − z2 j−1. The next larger critical taste distance is the one
in sub-markets with symmetric prices. It is equal to 1/2. Finally, only the consumers that
will be attracted by firm i ex post face up to the maximum critical taste distance which is
z2 j−1. Hence, G(s) can be rewritten as
G(s) =

2s if s ∈ [0, 1 − z2 j−1]
2s n−1
n
+ a1 if s ∈ (1 − z2 j−1, 12]
2s 1
n
+ a2 if s ∈ (12 , z2 j−1],
where a1 =
1−2z2 j−1
n
and a2 = (1 − 2z2 j−1n ). Using the properties of the reference–point
distributions, we rewrite the indirect utility functions of consumers buying from firm i or
i + 1,
ui( ˆxˆ+i , p′) =v − tz2i−1 − pi + (1 −
2z2i−1
n
)(p′ − pi) + λt4n
(
8z22i−1 − 4(2 + n)z2i−1 + 2 + n
)
ui+1( ˆxˆ+i , p′) =v − t(1 − z2i−1) − p′ − λ
2z2i−1
n
(p′ − pi)
+
t
4n
(
n
(
(2z2i−1 − 1)2 − 4λ(z2i−1 − 1)2
)
+ 2(2z2i−1 − 1)2
)
.
Next, we determine the location of the indifferent loss-averse consumer by setting ui =
ui+1. Rearranging leads to the following quadratic equation in z2 j−1,
4(λ − 1)(n + 2)t · z22i−1 +
(
8(λ − 1)∆p − 4(2n + (2(λ − 1) + (3λ − 1)n))t
)
· z2i−1
+
(
4(2)n∆p + 2(λ − 1)t + (4 + (5λ − 1))nt
)
= 0
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Solving this quadratic equation w.r.t. z2 j−1 and adding (i − 1) leads to ˆxˆ+i (∆p), the expres-
sion given in the lemma. The second solution to the quadratic equation can be ruled out
because it does not lie in the interval [1/2, 1]. 
E Appendix: Noisy Signals
In this appendix we modify our benchmark model and postulate that ex ante all consumers
are identical. Suppose that consumers receive a signal r about their location ex ante. Let
r be equal to the true ideal taste x with probability a and be noise with probability 1 − a
which is uniformly distributed on the circle.
E.1 Certainty Case
If the precision of the signal r is equal to 1 (a = 1)—i.e., if consumer know their location
ex ante for sure, we are back to the situation in which consumers are perfectly informed ex
ante. Here, a consumer’s initial plan is the only determinant of her reference point. This
raises the issue of multiple personal equilibria (PE) (see below) which can be resolved
by focussing on consumer’s preferred personal equilibria (PPE) (from an ex ante point
of view). In Proposition 3 of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) it is shown that, in the PPE of
an environment without uncertainty, consumers expect to choose the alternative which
maximizes their intrinsic utility with probability one. In our model, they simply behave
like standard Hotelling consumers: they buy from firm 1 if x ∈ [0, xˆ(∆p)] and from firm
2 otherwise.
We next derive a set of personal equilibria that will be useful for analyzing the uncer-
tainty case in the next subsection. There exists an interval [x(∆p), x(∆p)] including xˆ(∆p)
in which any element can be supported as a PE given corresponding expectations of con-
sumers ex ante. For instance, consider a consumer x1 who ex ante expects to buy the
cheaper product 1 (∆p ≥ 0) with probability one, σ = 1. This means that the probability
of paying price p2 and buying product 1 is zero. Her indirect utility when buying product
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1 ex post equals,
u1(x1, p1, p2|σ = 1) = v − tx1 − p1. (45)
Ex post for x1 > 1/2, her indirect utility when buying product 2 instead equals,
u2(x1, p1, p2|σ = 1) = v − t(1 − x1) − p2 − λ∆p + t(x1 − (1 − x1)). (46)
Note that, at x1 = xˆ(∆p), the consumer would buy product 1, since ∆u = u2 − u1 < 0.
Buying product 1 for sure reflects her PPE. The maximal location at which a consumer x1
would buy from firm 1, however, is given by ∆u = u2 − u1 = 0 and is equal to
xˆ(∆p|σ = 1) = λ + 1
2
∆p
2t
+
1
2
. (47)
Note that the maximal location for buying from firm 1 is larger than the location of the
indifferent Hotelling consumer, i.e., xˆ(∆p|σ = 1) > ∆p/(2t) + 1/2 = xˆ(∆p). We define
xˆ(∆p|σ = 1) ≡ x(∆p). Thus, buying from firm 1 with probability one is a PE for all
consumers x1 ∈ [0, x(∆p)].
We turn to the more general case in which a consumer xσ holds the initial plan to purchase
from firm 1 with probability σ, σ ∈ [0, 1]. Her indirect utility when buying product 1 ex
post equals,
u1(xσ, p1, p2|σ) = v − txσ − p1 + ∆p(1 − σ) − λt(xσ − (1 − xσ))(1 − σ) (48)
Her indirect utility when buying product 2 ex post equals,
u2(xσ, p1, p2|σ) = v − t(1 − xσ) − p2 − λ∆pσ + t(xσ − (1 − xσ))σ. (49)
∆u = 0 yields the following location of the indifferent consumer,
xˆ(∆p|σ) = (λ − 1)σ + 2(λ − 1)(1 − σ) + 2
∆p
2t
− 1
2
. (50)
For σ = 0, the minimal location for buying from firm 2 is lower than the location of the
indifferent Hotelling consumer—i.e., xˆ(∆p|σ = 0) < ∆p/(2t) + 1/2 = xˆ(∆p). Defining
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x(∆p) as xˆ(∆p|σ = 0), determines the interval in which multiple PE can exist. For in-
stance, buying from firm 2 with probability one is a PE for all consumers x2 ∈ [x(∆p), 1].
Thus, there exists an overlap in [x(∆p), x(∆p)] with the set of pure-strategy PE of buying
from firm 1. This means that in [x(∆p), x(∆p)] any pure–strategy PE (buying from firm i,
i ∈ {1, 2}) can be supported by corresponding initial expectations.
For any σ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a mixed-strategy PE for a consumer located at xσ =
xˆ(∆p|σ). It follows from (50) that firm 1’s demand is equal to that in the standard
Hotelling case for σ = 1/2 (or λ = 1). Buying from both firms with equal probabil-
ity is a mixed-strategy PE for a consumer located at x1/2 = xˆ(∆p) for all ∆p ≥ 0 such
that xˆ(∆p) ∈ [0, 1]. We will return to this PE in the next subsection when we introduce
uncertainty.
E.2 Uncertainty Case
If a < 1, consumers face some exogenous uncertainty when receiving a signal r: with
probability 1 − a their location is uniformly distributed on the circle. Consumers form
rational expectations about their ideal taste x after receiving their signal r. The probability
of buying from firm 1 ex post is equal to aσ + (1 − a) ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ), where ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ) is
the location of the indifferent consumer given precision a of the signal and consumer’s
strategy σ to buy from firm 1 with a, σ ∈ [0, 1]. For a consumer whose signal is close to
zero (the location of firm 1), σ = 1 is optimal ∀a, while the opposite holds for a consumer
whose signal is close to one (the location of firm 2). To determine the cutoff, we will
consider the consumer located at ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1/2) who is indifferent between choosing
product 1 and 2.
For p1 ≤ p2, we receive the following indirect utility for the general indifferent consumer,
x = ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ), who received signal, r = x, when buying from firm 1 ex post:
u1( ˆxˆ, ˆxˆ, p1, p2|a, σ) =(v − t ˆxˆ − p1) + ∆p(a(1 − σ) + (1 − a)(1 − ˆxˆ))
− λ · t
( ∫ 1− ˆxˆ
0
( ˆxˆ − s)2(1 − a)ds +
∫ ˆxˆ
1− ˆxˆ
( ˆxˆ − s)(1 − a)ds
+ a(1 − σ)( ˆxˆ − (1 − ˆxˆ))
)
. (51)
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Analogously, the general indifferent consumer’s indirect utility from a purchase of product
2 is given by
u2( ˆxˆ, ˆxˆ, p1, p2|a, σ) =(v − t(1 − ˆxˆ) − p2) − λ∆p(aσ + (1 − a) ˆxˆ)
− λ · t
( ∫ 1− ˆxˆ
0
((1 − ˆxˆ) − s)2(1 − a)ds
)
+ t
∫ ˆxˆ
1− ˆxˆ
(s − (1 − ˆxˆ))(1 − a)ds
+ taσ( ˆxˆ − (1 − ˆxˆ)). (52)
Solving for the location of the general indifferent uninformed consumer ˆxˆ, which is im-
plicitly given by ∆u = 0, yields
ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ) = 2λ − a(λ − 1)(σ + 1)
2(1 − a)(λ − 1) −
∆p
4t
− S (∆p|a, σ), (53)
where
S (∆p|a, σ) =
√
∆p2
16t2 −
(2(λ + 2) − a(λ − 1)(1 − σ))∆p
4(1 − a)(λ − 1)t +
((λ + 1) + aσ(λ − 1)
4(1 − a)2(λ − 1)2 (54)
and ∆p ≥ 0 but sufficiently small. It follows from (53) that, ∀σ, ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ) converges to
ˆxˆ(∆p) if a → 0—i.e., if there is pure noise. Note that ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ) is increasing in σ and
thus, ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 0) < ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1/2) < ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1). This means that consumers
who expect to buy from firm 1 are more likely to buy from firm 1 ex post and vice versa.
We next consider the PE in which consumers use the cutoff ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1/2) to evaluate
their initial signal. Note that this cutoff converges to xˆ(∆p) for a → 1.50 In this PE all
consumers who received a signal r ∈ [0, ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1/2)] expect to buy from firm 1
with probability σ = 1 if the signal is correct, while consumers who received a signal
r ∈ ( ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1/2), 1] expect to buy from firm 1 with probability σ = 0 if the signal is
correct. In case their signal turns out to be incorrect, consumers who expected to buy from
firm 1 with probability one (resp. zero) buy from firm 1 with probability ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1)
50Cf. equation (50) in the previous subsection. By continuity in a, we receive that convergence to xˆ(∆p)
is a property which is also satisfied by the cutoff of the PPE. In the following, we will use the cutoff
ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1/2) for a < 1 instead of the cutoff of the PPE since the derivation of the latter is analytically
intractable as it requires the maximization of consumer’s expected utility at the initial stage over this cutoff
for all possible signals and all possible realized match values.
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(resp. ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 0)) depending on the realization of their true match value.
It can easily be shown that the cutoff ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1/2) is monotonous in the precision
a. This means that ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ = 1/2) is either monotonously increasing in a if ∆p ≥ 0 is
small such that ˆxˆ(∆p) < xˆ(∆p) or monotonously decreasing in a if ∆p ≥ 0 is sufficiently
large such that ˆxˆ(∆p) > xˆ(∆p)—see Figure 1.
The corresponding demand of firm 1, q1(∆p, a) equals,
q1(∆p, a) =
∫ ˆxˆ(∆p|a,1/2)
0
(
a + (1 − a)
∫ ˆxˆ(∆p|a,1)
0
ds
)
dr +
∫ 1
ˆxˆ(∆p|a,1/2)
(
(1 − a)
∫ ˆxˆ(∆p|a,0)
0
ds
)
dr
=a ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1/2) + (1 − a)
(
ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1/2) ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1) + [1 − ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1/2)] ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 0)
)
(55)
Since by construction ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1/2) converges to xˆ(∆p, 1/2) = xˆ(∆p) for a → 1,51 so
does q1(∆p, a). The symmetric equilibrium markup for a demand of ˆxˆ(∆p|a, σ) can be
calculated as
p∗i (a, σ) − c =
2((λ + 1) − (λ − 1)aσ)t
(λ + 3) + (λ − 1)a(2σ − 1) , i = 1, 2. (56)
It follows that the symmetric equilibrium markup for a demand of ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1/2),
p∗(a, 1/2) − c = (2(λ + 1) − (λ − 1)a)t/(λ + 3)
which is decreasing in precision of the signal a. This symmetric equilibrium markup is an
upper bound on the corresponding markup for demand q1(∆p, a); see Lemma 12 below.
(Note that p∗(0, 1/2) − c is equal to the markup formula in (7) and p∗(1, 1/2) − c = t.)
This yields monotonicity of symmetric markups in a and thus robustness of our results in
symmetric settings to the introduction of noisy signals which decrease the uncertainty of
uninformed, loss–averse consumers before they form their reference point distributions.
Lemma 12. In symmetric duopoly, the markup for a demand of ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1/2) is weakly
51More precisely, the solution of ∆u(σ = 1/2) = 0 converges to xˆ(∆p) for a → 1. In the limit ∆u(σ =
1/2) = 0 becomes a linear equation of xˆ.
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larger than the equilibrium markup for the demand with noisy signals q1(∆p, a) for all
a ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Lemma 12. Applying the markup formula for symmetric duopoly in (8), m ˆxˆ(σ=1/2)(a) ≥
mq1(a), for all a ∈ [0, 1], is equivalent to ˆxˆ′(∆p = 0|a, 1/2) ≤ q′1(∆p = 0|a), for all
a ∈ [0, 1]. It follows from (53) that ˆxˆ(∆p = 0|a, σ) = 1/2 for all σ ∈ [0, 1]. Using this
fact, the first derivative of q1(∆p, a) w.r.t. ∆p at ∆p = 0 can be expressed as
q′1(∆p = 0|a) = a ˆxˆ′(∆p = 0|a, 1/2) + (1 − a)
(1
2
( ˆxˆ′(∆p = 0|a, 1) + ˆxˆ′(∆p = 0|a, 0))
)
∀a ∈ [0, 1].
Then, q′1(∆p = 0|a) is weakly larger than ˆxˆ′(∆p = 0|a, 1/2) for all a ∈ [0, 1] if and only if
1
2
(
ˆxˆ′(∆p = 0|a, 1) + ˆxˆ′(∆p = 0|a, 0)
)
≥ ˆxˆ′(∆p = 0|a, 1/2).
Using (53), the previous inequality can be transformed to
a2(λ − 1)2((3 − a)λ + 5 + a)
8(λ + 1)((1 − a)λ + 1 + a)(λ + 2 + a)t ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ [0, 1),
This inequality is always satisfied which completes the proof. 
However, even though the initial cutoff ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1/2) is monotonous in a, we cannot rule
out that the resulting demand q1(∆p, a) is non–monotonous in a. An example is illustrated
in Figure 10. The reason for the non–monotonicity in a is that consumers who receive
a signal in favor of buying from the more efficient firm with a very high precision a are
locked in into buying from that firm due to a high expected gain in the price dimension.
Hence, they will not “switch” to the less efficient firm even though the initial signal turns
out to be incorrect and consumers’ true match value strongly favors the latter firm. This
boosts the demand of the more efficient firm for very precise signals. While the non-
monotonicity does not affect qualitatively our results in a symmetric setting, it may well
affect them in asymmetric duopoly.
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The cutoffs ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1/2) (which defines whether the initial signal is in favor of buying
from firm 1 or 2), ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 1) (if the initial signal in favor of buying from firm 1 was
incorrect), and ˆxˆ(∆p|a, 0) (if the initial signal if the initial signal in favor of buying
from firm 2 was incorrect) as a function of the signal precision a for given price dif-
ference ∆p = 0.2 (which is sufficiently small such that ˆxˆ(∆p) < xˆ(∆p)) and λ = 3;
ˆxˆ(∆p|a = 0, 1/2) = ˆxˆ(∆p) = 0.6060 and ˆxˆ(∆p|a = 1, 1/2) = xˆ(∆p) = 0.625.
Figure 10: Noisy Signals: Cutoffs for Small Price Difference
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